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Abstract
Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the newly independent states of Central Asia
faced numerous challenges. These included cultivating new national identities and state capacity,
managing new borders, and addressing issues of conflict and political violence. Converging with
these challenges – a booming trade in opium and heroin originating in neighboring Afghanistan.
Central Asia quickly became a key route for opiates originating in Afghanistan and transiting to
Russia and Europe. The Kyrgyz Republic lies at the southeastern corner of this region, along one
of the world’s busiest drug trafficking routes.
This thesis examines state and societal responses to narcotics trafficking in the Kyrgyz
Republic with a specific emphasis on the role of ethnicity, religion, kinship, and patronage
networks. In doing so, it seeks to discern the role played by narcotics trafficking in the broader
political-geographic space of the Republic, paying specific attention to state capacity. Likewise,
it is interested in how these processes both shape and are shaped by political-geographic space. It
relies on publicly available data provided by the Kyrgyz Government as well as the UNODC.
More importantly, it derives context from a series of interviews and observations obtained during
fieldwork in the Kyrgyz Republic during the summer of 2018. These interviews – conducted
with officials from academia, non-governmental organizations, international governmental
organizations, diplomatic missions, and the Kyrgyz government, provide critical context to
broader research efforts and previous work conducted on this subject.
This thesis ultimately supports some recent scholarship conducted on narcotics
trafficking in the Republic, while also challenging the premises of older discourse on the drug
trade in the region. In doing so it hopes to reinvigorate scholarship and policy debates on the
Eurasian narcotics trade and broader illicit geographies.
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Chapter I: Introduction
Central Asia has long been a fixture for trafficking of Afghan opiates, which account for
over 90% of the global heroin supply. 1 Opiates flowing along the “northern route,” transit the
Central Asian Republics or Transcaucasia before entering Russia and Eastern Europe. While
only accounting for five percent of global seizures in 2015, Russian authorities have claimed that
up to twenty percent of heroin seized in Russia is trafficked along this route. 2
This research is concerned with the effects of trafficking on the political geography of
Central Asia. Namely, it seeks to discern the influence of factors including kinship, ethnicity, and
religious affiliation as they pertain to narcotics trafficking and subsequent responses in the
Kyrgyz Republic. More importantly, this research is concerned with the role of trafficking and
responses as they pertain to political geography and state capacity in the Kyrgyz Republic, with a
special emphasis on how these processes both manifest spatially and in turn shape space.
In terms of situating this work, this research examines a subject – transnational narcotics
trafficking – often overlooked within political geography and Middle East Studies. It furthermore
examines this subject in the context of themes and discourses common within regional studies of
both Southwest and Central Asia. More importantly, this research contributes to a body of
literature which has remained sporadic in its treatment of this issue, with periodic shifts in
interest and disinterest dating to the 1990s. It likewise incorporates mixed methodology –
cartographic representation and field interviews – which are also lacking in existing literatures.

1

Tom Bowman, “Afghan Governor Wants Government To Control Poppy Crop,” NPR.org, accessed February 7,
2019, https://www.npr.org/2016/07/06/484894669/afghan-governor-wants-government-to-control-poppy-crop.
2

UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME, World Drug Report 2017 (Set of 5 Booklets). (Vienna,
Austria: UNITED NATIONS, 2017), https://www.unodc.org/wdr2017/index.html.

1

In doing so, it hopes to reinvigorate scholarly discussions of the Eurasian drug trade within the
discipline of political geography. Beyond academia, this research aims to serve as publicly
accessible scholarship on the Eurasian drug trade. In doing so, it hopes to challenge
commonplace misconceptions and serve as a resource for analysts and policymakers working on
efforts related to US policy in Southwest and Central Asia.
Research Questions
This thesis explores the topic of narcotics trafficking and state capacity the Kyrgyz
Republic through a series of research questions. They are as follows:
● How do religious, ethnic, or kinship affiliations affect state and societal responses to
narcotics trafficking in the Kyrgyz Republic?
● How do narcotics trafficking and subsequent responses impact state capacity in the
Kyrgyz Republic?
● How do both processes manifest spatially?
The first question draws upon many of the continuing challenges faced by the Kyrgyz
Republic in the years following the collapse of the Soviet Union. These issues are but a handful
of the challenges faced by the Republic, but also among the most pronounced. The second
question assumes that the process of narcotics trafficking plays a key role in shaping state
capacity in the Republic. While the notion of state capacity is somewhat of a connotative
chimera - as will be discussed in Chapter II - assessing the effects of the narcotics trade on state
capacity is crucial to understanding the political geography of Kyrgyzstan. Likewise, assessing
state capacity is critical to understanding responses to the narcotics trade. Finally, as a piece of
scholarship in geography it is vital to relate how these processes manifest spatially – namely,
how do both processes shape the broader political-geographic space of Kyrgyzstan?
2

Limitations, Delimitations, and Assumptions
This thesis represents an attempt to answer these questions in the context of research
conducted over a two-year period. As such, this thesis was drafted with a clear set of limitations,
delimitations, and assumptions. Limitations include the limited scope of field interviews and
access to data. In short, field interviews presented unique challenges, as did obtaining
quantitative data. These challenges - further detailed in Chapter III - were addressed to the fullest
extent possible considering exigent circumstances.
Regarding delimitations, the scope of this research is limited to the Kyrgyz Republic.
While the intent of this research is to provide a framework for conducting further research in
Southwest and Central Asia on the relationship between crime, political violence, and state
capacity, this thesis limits its focus to a single country. This consideration was influenced by
concerns of research feasibility, cost, ease of access, available resources and contacts, and
researcher safety. Future research intends to address these questions over a broader geographic
context, if possible.
This thesis operates under several assumptions - many of which were directly influenced
by fieldwork. Foremost, this thesis assumes that the narratives collected during the course of
fieldwork represent a specific, limited perspective in terms of the research questions being
assessed - what Sally Cummings and Ole Norgaard term a “critical case subset.” 3 The
breakdown of these perspectives based on metadata – interviewee, location, date, language, etc. will be detailed in Chapter IV. As will be discussed in Chapter V, one of the major challenges

3

Sally N. Cummings and Ole Nørgaard, “Conceptualising State Capacity: Comparing Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan,”
Political Studies 52, no. 4 (December 2004): 692, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9248.2004.00503.x.

3

presented at the conclusion of fieldwork was deciphering competing narratives presented by the
perspectives of interviewees.
Fieldwork also proved useful in developing assumptions regarding the integrity of
available quantitative data. Namely, as a result of fieldwork this thesis assumes that open-access
data detailing annual drug seizures in Kyrgyzstan and the region at large represent a small
fraction of what is being trafficked. For those familiar with the region, this seems inherently
intuitive considering often-inconsistent reporting by countries, as well as significant levels of
political corruption - especially tied to narcotics policing. These numbers are thus viewed as an
approximation - as well as with a healthy dose of Disraelian skepticism.
The third assumption of this research pertains to the assumed role of ethnic identity and
identity perceptions. As will be discussed in Chapter IV, prior to field research it was assumed
that perceived ethnic identity would play a key role in influencing state responses to narcotics
trafficking - as it does in the United States and many other countries. Interviews largely disputed
this notion. Still, ethnic identity continues to play a critical role in the political geography of the
Republic. This assumption will be explored in Chapters II, III, and V.
Finally, this research assumes that trafficking is fundamentally a spatial process in that it
both shapes and is shaped by space. This assumption extends to responses to trafficking as well.
More importantly, this research assumes that these spatial processes play a larger role in shaping
the Kyrgyz Republic as a political-geographic space. This assumption will also be explored
further in Chapters II, III, and V.

4

Terminology and Definitions
Before delving into relevant literature on the topic at-hand, it is imperative to clarify the
nomenclature which will be employed within this thesis. This includes various terminology and
acronyms utilized throughout the body of this work. The former is detailed in narrative form
below, whereas the latter are attached as an appendix (See Appendix A).
Foremost, under the purview of this thesis ‘drugs,’ and ‘narcotics,’ are used to denote
“narcotic drugs,” as defined by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). Per
the UNODC:
“In the context of international drug control, “narcotic drug” means any of the
substances, natural or synthetic, in Schedules I and II of the Single Convention
on Narcotic Drugs, 1961, and that Convention as amended by the 1972
Protocol Amending the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961.” 4
In this case, narcotics denote both plant-based and synthetic drugs, including opium and opiates,
coca and cocaine, amphetamines, hallucinogens, cannabinoids, and a variety of other stimulants
and depressants subject to international control regimes.
This thesis details the state and societal responses to narcotics trafficking in the Kyrgyz
Republic with the goal of assessing state capacity. This is primarily in the context of trafficking
in opiates, i.e. raw and processed opium and heroin. As will be discussed in Chapter V, however,
the nature of the narcotics trade in Kyrgyzstan is changing. Synthetic narcotics including
amphetamines, club drugs, hallucinogens, and synthetic cannabinoids were repeatedly cited as
growing in prominence. Experts interviewed broadly termed these drugs ‘NPS,’ or ‘new
psychotropic substances.’ This is a catchall term generally applied to synthetic narcotics which

4

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Terminology and Information on Drugs, 2016,
https://www.unodc.org/documents/scientific/Terminology_and_Information_on_Drugs-3rd_edition.pdf.
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also appears in official UN reports. Beyond specific instances - which will be discussed - this
thesis utilizes the term ‘NPS’ when referring to synthetic narcotics. 5
Throughout this thesis the Kyrgyz Republic will be referenced in several different ways.
While the official country name is the “Kyrgyz Republic,” it may simply be referred to as
“Kyrgyzstan.” The latter is considered acceptable and retains widespread usage. Furthermore, the
simple short form “the Republic,” may also be employed. In Russian-language sources, the
Republic is sometimes designated “Kirghizia,” however this thesis will refrain from doing so
unless directly quoting a Russian-language source. Likewise, older source material may use
alternate spellings regarding the ethnonym and titular nationality for which the country was
named - often employing ‘Kirghiz’ or ‘Kirgiz’ instead of ‘Kyrgyz.’ This thesis will employ the
modern spelling and country designation unless an alternate spelling or designation appears in a
direct quotation. Citizens of the Republic may alternatively be referred to as “Kyrgyz,” or
“Kyrgyzstani,” depending on the context, however these terms are used interchangeably. When
discussing “Kyrgyz,” as a titular nationality, it will be clear from context.
Considering this research was conducted in a Kyrgyzstan - formerly a republic of the
Soviet Union - it uses the term ‘post-Soviet,’ extensively. In most contexts, this term is being
used as a temporal designation to indicate a period following the end of the Soviet Union. There
are several instances, however, where this term refers to spatial rather than temporal
characteristics. This will be clear from the context. Furthermore, a portion of the literature
review in Chapter II will detail the latter usage of the term.

5

Anonymous UN Official, Interview with Anonymous UN Official, interview by Christopher Cowan, In-Person,
June 29, 2018; Alexander Zelichenko, Interview with Alexander Zelichenko, interview by Christopher Cowan, InPerson, July 4, 2018.
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When referring to the Middle East, this thesis will use the geographic designation of
Southwest Asia. If the context includes North Africa, then Southwest Asia/North Africa will be
utilized. Regarding the geographic focus of this thesis - Central Asia - several terms exist within
literature on the region which may be referenced. These terms include Central Asia, Eurasia,
Central Eurasia, Inner Asia, and Inner Eurasia. This thesis will utilize the term “Central Asia,”
when referring to the region – operating under the contemporary definition which indicates the
five post-Soviet republics which occupy the stretch of territory between China and the Caspian
Sea and between Russia and Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan. While this concept of territory will
be explored further in Chapter III, generally this definition is informed by the work of acclaimed
Pakistani journalist Ahmed Rashid.6 It is likewise informed by drug seizure data sourced from
the UNODC. The latter definition includes the countries of the region – Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan – alongside the countries of the South Caucasus –
Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia – under the broader territorial umbrella of “Central Asia and
Transcaucasia.”7
This thesis makes use of the term “nexus,” when referring to cooperation and/or
collaboration between criminal organizations and other violent non-state actors such as insurgent
or terrorist groups. There is considerable debate as to the extent and proper characterization of
this phenomena. As such, this concept will further be explored in Chapter II. In general,

6

R.M. Alimov, Tsentralnaya Asiya - Obschnost Interesov (Tashkent: Shark, 2005),
https://www.worldcat.org/title/tsentralnaia-aziia-obshchnost-interesov/oclc/171275037; Ahmed Rashid, The
Resurgence of Central Asia: Islam or Nationalism?, Book, Whole (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1994);
Alexander von Humboldt, Asie centrale: Recherches sur les Chaînes des Montagnes et la Climotologie Comparée.,
3 vols. (Paris: Gide, 1843), https://archive.org/details/asiecentralerec04humbgoog/page/n8.
7

Rashid, Islam or Nationalism?; UNODC, “Annual Drug Seizures, Kg Equivalents. UNODC World Drug Report
2018.,” UNODC Statistics and Data, 2018, https://dataunodc.un.org/drugs/seizures.
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however, use of this term is intended to indicate cooperation and/or collaboration between
criminal organizations and violent non-state actors.
Finally, this thesis will employ several acronyms. There is a full table of these acronyms
included in Appendix A. Several of the more commonly utilized examples are as follows:
● International Governmental Organizations may be referenced as IGOs
● The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan may be referenced as IMU
● Kyrgyzstan’s Ministry of Internal Affairs may be referenced as MoIA
● The National Statistical Committee of the Kyrgyz Republic may be referenced as stat.kg
● Non-Governmental Organizations may be referenced as NGOs
● Southwest Asia and North Africa may be referred to as SWANA
● Synthetic Narcotics may be referenced as NPS, New Psychoactive Substances
● The United Nations may be referenced as UN
● The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime may be referenced as UNODC
Chapter I Summary
This chapter provided a brief introduction of the research topic and its significance. It
then discussed the questions which guided this research endeavor, likewise, discussing the
limitations, delimitations, and assumptions under which this research was conducted. Finally, it
provided a brief introduction to several unfamiliar terms and concepts central to this work.
Moving forward, Chapter II provides a literature review examining three concepts: state and state
capacity, narcotics trafficking, and the insurgent-criminal nexus. Chapter III includes a site
survey of the region on which research is focused and wherein fieldwork was conducted,
respectively examining Central Asia broadly and the Kyrgyz Republic specifically. Chapter IV
details data collection methodology, rationale, procedure, and treatment. Research findings are
8

discussed at length in Chapter V. Finally, Chapter VI provides a conclusion of this thesis and
suggests areas for further inquiry.

9

Chapter II: Drugs, Insurgents, and States
The following literature review seeks to clarify three main concepts as they relate to this
research. Foremost, this literature review will examine relevant literature on the narcotics trade
in Central Asia. It proceeds to examine literature on the “insurgent-criminal nexus.” Owing to
the scant literature in geography on each subject, these sections incorporate information from
across the broader spectrum of social sciences. Finally, it assesses concepts of state and state
capacity through a review of selected literature from political geography, political science,
sociology, and economics. In doing so it seeks to provide an operative framework for concepts of
state and state capacity.
A Geography of Drug Trafficking
This thesis focuses on the geography of opiate trafficking in Central Asia. Within
Geography, and under the broader purview of social sciences, this remains a niche topic. While
considerable academic effort has been devoted to studying cultivation and consumption of
narcotics, relatively little effort has been spent examining how drugs transit from producer to
consumer. Also puzzling is the dearth of significant material in Geography despite the inherently
spatial nature of drug transit. There are numerous plausible explanations for this including safety
concerns, the covert nature of the activity and those orchestrating it, and the difficulty-of-access
in regard to both research subjects and sites.8 These considerations in mind, this section will

8

Natalie Koch, “Introduction - Field Methods in ‘Closed Contexts’: Undertaking Research in Authoritarian States
and Places: Introduction - Field Methods in ‘Closed Contexts,’” Area 45, no. 4 (December 2013): 390–95,
https://doi.org/10.1111/area.12044; Jonathan S. Taylor, Christopher Jasparro, and Kevin Mattson, “Geographers
And Drugs: A Survey Of The Literature,” Geographical Review 103, no. 3 (July 2013): 415–30,
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1931-0846.2013.00007.x; Johnathan Walker and Jonathan Leib, “Revisiting the Topia
Road: Walking in the Footsteps of West and Parsons,” Geographical Review 92, no. 4 (2002): 555–81.
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provide a brief overview of relevant literature on the Central Asian narcotics trade encountered
in geography and other social science fields during research.
“Geographers and Drugs: A Survey of the Literature,” provides the best starting point for
surveying relevant literature in political geography on the Eurasian drug trade. 9 Taylor et al. note
that while geographers have made limited contributions - often in a “scattershot,” fashion –
these contributions have proved valuable to assessing cultivation and production, trafficking and
distribution, sale and consumption, and the broader geopolitics of illegal drugs. 10 In terms of
cultivation and production geographies, coca, cocaine, and opium remain broadly studied
whereas cannabis and synthetics are often neglected.11 As such, most literature on trafficking
focuses on traffic originating in Latin America and terminating in North America or Western
Europe; literature on trafficking of Afghan-derived opiates remains scant within the discipline. 12
Political and critical geography provide more robust literatures on the illicit narcotics
trade, particularly examining the relationship between the drug trade, conflict, and institutions.
Geographers have also provided critical assessments of global counter-narcotics efforts, notably
the U.S. “War on Drugs,” in terms of power structures and globalization. 13 Geographies of
consumption are largely tied to medical geography and ethnography, but in general consumption

9

Taylor, Jasparro, and Mattson, “Geographers And Drugs.”

10

Taylor, Jasparro, and Mattson, 415.
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Kendra McSweeney et al., “Why Do Narcos Invest in Rural Land?,” Journal of Latin American Geography 16,
no. 2 (2017): 3–29, https://doi.org/10.1353/lag.2017.0019; Zoe Pearson and Nicholas J. Crane, “The Challenge of
Feminist Political Geography to State-Centrism in Latin American Geography,” Journal of Latin American
Geography 16, no. 1 (2017): 185–93, https://doi.org/10.1353/lag.2017.0011; Taylor, Jasparro, and Mattson,
“Geographers And Drugs,” 416–20.
12

Taylor, Jasparro, and Mattson, “Geographers And Drugs,” 420.

13

Taylor, Jasparro, and Mattson, 421–23.
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remains understudied.14 Some areas, including consumption geographies of drug tourism, remain
completely unexplored.15 Ultimately, geography offers a wellspring of methods, tools,
approaches, and subdisciplines which can be employed to contribute to broader scholarship on
illicit narcotics.16
Importantly, Taylor et al. grounds this research in three regards. Foremost they provide
justification for this research by indicating a general lack of literature on the Eurasian drug trade
within Geography proper. Granted, this is likely tied to the difficult nature of the research topic.
According to the authors:
“Why is the geography of illegal drugs so lacking? The difficulty associated
with researching illegal drugs is one obvious reason. Factor in the very real
threat of personal danger when conducting fieldwork on criminal enterprises
and it is clear that geographic work on illegal drugs is considerably more
difficult to conduct than geographic work on other agricultural or industrial
commodities. Beyond difficulty and personal risk, research on illegal drugs
may well be stigmatized by social, political, and cultural currents, to the extent
that research in this area is actively discouraged, for example, by Ph.D.
committees supervising graduate students.” 17

To be sure, these are both valid concerns and impediments to research. Challenges in this regard
will be further explored in Chapters IV and V. Still, such difficulties do not preclude geographic
inquiry; in fact, they all but necessitate further exploration. They likewise affirm the value of

14

Geoffrey DeVerteuil and Robert D. Wilton, “The Geographies of Intoxicants: From Production and Consumption
to Regulation, Treatment and Prevention,” Geography Compass 3, no. 1 (2009): 478–94; Eugene McCann and
Cristina Temenos, “Mobilizing Drug Consumption Rooms: Inter-Place Networks and Harm Reduction Drug
Policy,” Health & Place 31 (2015): 216–23; Taylor, Jasparro, and Mattson, “Geographers And Drugs,” 424–25;
Robert Wilton and Christopher M Moreno, “Critical Geographies of Drugs and Alcohol,” 2012.
15

Taylor, Jasparro, and Mattson, “Geographers And Drugs,” 427.

16

Taylor, Jasparro, and Mattson, 426–27.

17

Taylor, Jasparro, and Mattson, 427.
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well-planned fieldwork despite the significant challenges and potential concerns. While these
challenges may eventually impede further research, fieldwork nonetheless lends unique and
unparalleled observations and context to geographies of narcotics.
As indicated in Taylor et al. there are some geographers conducting extensive research on
the narcotics trade, one of whom is Pierre-Arnaud Chouvy. With specific regard to Central Asian
opiate trafficking, Opium provides a foundational text - simultaneously one of the most
comprehensive yet concise summaries of the history, geopolitics, and political economy of the
global opium trade.18 Relying extensively on fieldwork conducted in Southeast and South Asia,
Chouvy lends a unique and unmatched expertise to the discourse and traces the deep roots
contemporary issues surrounding cultivation, trafficking, and consumption of opiates. With
specific regards to Central and Southwest Asia, Chouvy details a history of trafficking dating to
the Hellenic era to the present. While opium cultivation was historically confined to Southeast
and South Asia – excluding Afghanistan – the strategic geopolitics of British and Russian
imperial expansion in the region during the Great Game gradually forced cultivation and
trafficking northward.19 The full consequences of this shift became pronounced following the
Soviet-Afghan War and the broader collapse of the Soviet Union. 20
While statistics regarding narcotics trafficking in Central Asia are often exaggerated – as
will be discussed in Chapter V – Chouvy notes the stark increases in narcotics traffic as reported
by the UN and the region’s republics in the late 1990s and early 2000s. Initially, the UN believed

18

Pierre-Arnaud Chouvy, Opium: Uncovering the Politics of the Poppy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,
2010).
19

Chouvy, 80–82.

20

Chouvy, 82, 86–88.
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that 65% of opiates cultivated in Afghanistan were passing through the region; this estimate was
later revised to 15%. Nonetheless, between 1998 and 1999 Tajikistan and Uzbekistan
respectively reported a 250% and 600% increase in illicit narcotics trafficking. The following
year Kyrgyzstan’s Interior Ministry reported a 1600% increase in overall seizures with an 800%
increase in heroin specifically. 21 While the Taliban had recently come to power in Afghanistan,
their prohibition on opium cultivation would not be enacted until 2000/2001; this did not
preclude their adversaries, the Northern Alliance, from continuing to fund their operations
through drug cultivation and trafficking.22
With regards to Central Asia, Chouvy’s work illustrates the challenges faced by the
newly independent states of the region in the 1990s – particularly with political violence and
struggles to cultivate institutional capacity. Both challenges are intimately linked to the drug
trade considering the propensity of Tajik and Uzbek militant groups to fund their activities
through criminal enterprise, as well as the challenges faced by the new states of the region in
policing their borders.23 Chouvy’s work also discusses the role of terrain, topography, and space
in the narcotics trade, noting that cultivation and production of organically-based illicit narcotics
is increasingly concentrated in terrain which provides the requisite balance between remoteness
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and access.24 Beyond the spatiality of cultivation and production, this discussion further
intimates the inherently spatial nature of the trafficking process as well as the direct linkages
between trafficking and state capacity, as will be explored later in this section. 25
Aside from Opium, Chouvy provides critical insight into typologies of space typically
associated with geographies of illicit narcotics – namely the idea of “the narco-state.” 26 Like
terrorism, the notion of a narco-state is widely employed albeit ill-defined. In many discussions
of narcotics trafficking, the term “narco-state” is utilized to imply that a nation-state or de-facto
state relies on revenues from cultivation, trafficking, or both as its primary source of state
income, and by extension a primary fiscal source of state capacity. The term emerged in the
1980s following the ouster of Bolivian dictator Luis Garcia Meza – a coup allegedly financed by
drug traffickers.27 Since the inception of the term, the label has been applied in a range of
contexts including Colombia, Mexico, and Afghanistan. 28 Less commonly considered are Guinea
Bissau, Tajikistan, and areas of Myanmar. Kyrgyzstan has also been subject to this
characterization.29
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In his critique of the narco-state, Chouvy argues that the entire notion is simultaneously
overused and ill defined – rendering it a faulty ideation of space. Furthermore, he argues the term
should only be utilized in the context of states where the state itself is an active sponsor of the
narcotics trade and where a majority of overall GDP is derived from this activity. This bimodal
condition in mind, a true narco-state remains elusive. While many alleged cases have robust
illicit economies with various degrees of state involvement and/or benefit, in Chouvy’s
estimation there are currently no states which truly qualify as narco-states. In further challenging
this trend, Chouvy explores critical discourse on the term. 30 This mirrors certain critical and
feminist geographies which discuss the use of terminology as a manifestation of hegemony and
scalar power differentials between the global north and the global south in discourses of state
failure and fragility. The common thread between these discourses is the idea that terms like
“failed state,” and “narco-state,” are often used to advance ulterior geopolitical motives – often
tied to securitization and counterterrorism.31
Chouvy’s critique of the notion of the “narco-state,” raises several questions. Foremost –
what is the proper way to characterize the proverbial narco-state considering its prevalence in
literature on narcotics trafficking?32 In this regard, rather than refigure Chouvy’s critique, it is
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perhaps best to acknowledge that while a “narco-state,” may not exist there are doubtless states
which benefit from illicit activity. Unrecognized territorial entities – quasi-states – often fall
within this category.33 One example is Transnistria - the breakaway region between Moldova and
Ukraine. Transnistria is perceived as reliant on smuggling – everything from chicken to weapons
– as a primary economic activity.34 While diplomats have argued that these reports are
exaggerated, there are other examples in the South Caucasus and Central Asia of codified states
where such activity is more pronounced – including Armenia, Georgia, and Tajikistan. 35 Beyond
the purview of the former Soviet Union, a number of countries benefit as havens for activities
such as illicit finance – including Panama, the Bahamas, and Malta. For their part, state elites
themselves often engage in or directly benefit from illicit activity.
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This intimates the second question raised by Chouvy’s work; namely, how is the “state,”
defined? Few countries in the international system would consider adopting policies explicitly
favorable to illicit narcotics trafficking. In many countries, however, individual elites or specific
institutions often directly engage in illicit activity as a method of sustainment. 36 This is as true of
quasi-states as it is of licit states and takes a variety of forms. Kleptocracy - where elites utilize
the privilege and financial resources afforded by their status as state elites for personal benefit –
is one such iteration. While not a new concept, various scholarship has covered this issue in
detail over the past decade. This notably includes Why Nations Fail and Thieves of State – both
of which are premised on the notion of kleptocracy as a key hinderance to the development of a
functional state.37 Central Asia is rife with examples of such behavior –sometimes linked to the
politics of space, spectacle, and new nationalism. 38 In the case of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan
there have long-existed allegations that the same elites pilfering state coffers also benefit from
the narcotics trade.39 In these comparatively nascent states, Charles Tilly’s characterization of
state formation as a form of organized crime rings particularly salient. 40 That noted, a key flaw of
Chouvy’s argument is the over-emphasis on the overall institutions of the state to the detriment
of individual elites and/or singular institutions within the state engaging in illicit activity as a
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means of personal sustainment. This is as true of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan is it is of many other
nation-states where patronage politics and kinship ties play a dominant role in shaping the
political apparatus of the state, and where the lines between crime and politics are vague and
obscured.41
Beyond Chouvy’s critical scholarship in Geography on the opium trade, several other
notable contributions to drug geographies include recent work on geographies of coca production
and trafficking in Latin America.42 Other salient work includes that of Kyle T. Evered – whose
historical geography and oral histories of opium-poppy cultivation in rural Anatolia served as an
inspiration for interview-based fieldwork. 43 Considering the linkages between trafficking,
political violence, and conflict, Philippe Le Billon’s “The Political Ecology of War,” proves
similarly illuminative in examining how non-state actors utilize extraction and trafficking of
illicit resources as sources of sustainment.44
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Outside of Geography, investigative journalism and other social sciences including
International Relations, Political Science, and Security Studies provide good scholarship on the
relationship between trafficking, crime, political violence, and state capacity. This includes
Gretchen Peters Seeds of Terror – which explores the linkages between the Taliban and other
anti-government militants in Afghanistan and the opiate trade; Peters work also provides stark
commentary on the challenges this relationship poses to long-term efforts at cultivating stability,
state, peace, and prosperity in Afghanistan.45 Sergey Gulonov’s work on trafficking between
Russia and Kazakhstan goes into considerable depth in detailing the challenges encountered by
Russian and Kazakh efforts to police narcotics trafficking across a seven thousand kilometer land
border.46 Finally, several further articles which examine trafficking at national and regional
scales are insightful in their findings and commentary pertaining to this research.
Foremost is “The Eurasian Drug Trade: A Challenge to Regional Security,” by Svante
Cornell and Niklas Swanström.47 Cornell and Swanström are insightful about the challenges
posed by trafficking at a regional level and to the individual governments of Central Asia, and
also reiterate the close links between violent non-state actors and the narcotics trade. Based on
the events of the late 1990s and early 2000s, at the time this analysis was well-founded. In the
former Soviet periphery, Tajikistan was emerging from a brutal civil war which had generally
seen an increase in criminality as a result of various factions utilizing criminal enterprise to
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sustain their activities.48 During the same period, a nascent militant Islamist movement – the
Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) – was alleged to be financing its operations across the
region through involvement in the heroin trade. 49 At the current juncture, the article proves
useful as a framework for examining the issue of narcotics trafficking through a Security Studies
framework. It likewise serves as a temporal snapshot of trafficking and militancy of the region,
but does not necessarily reflect current trends seeing as groups such as the IMU and other
Islamist militants are viewed as playing an increasingly minor role in terrorism and trafficking
inside Central Asia.50
The best empirical work encountered during research is that of Mariya Omelicheva and
Lawrence Markowitz. Funded by a Department of Defense Minerva Grant, their work builds on
that of Cornell and Swanström – seeking to assess whether the linkages between violent nonstate actors and traffickers are indeed pronounced as alleged. Using aggregate data including
yearly drug seizures and geolocations of terrorist attacks and individual drug seizures, they
conclude that total volume of seizures in a given province or oblast is “a significant and positive
predictor of terrorist violence,” by nonstate actors.51 However, they likewise caution that there
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are other significant covariates which may influence these patterns. They also note that state
involvement in illicit trafficking is prevalent, particularly in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. 52
Finally, Alexander Kupatadze provides a superb assessment of the drug trafficking
landscape in Kyrgyzstan circa the early 2010s. 53 In “Kyrgyzstan - a virtual narcostate?” he
challenges the two commonplace assumptions regarding the trafficking landscape in Kyrgyzstan
based on a series of seventy field interviews he conducted during 2012 while working as a
consultant to the Kyrgyz government. 54 His argument posits that an accurate picture of the
narcotics trade in Kyrgyzstan remains murky. Despite this, he notes a that the discussion has
traditionally been dominated by two perspectives, one which alleges considerable state
involvement in trafficking and the other which emphasizes the role of non-state actors including
criminal and Islamist groups.55 Kupatadze argues the reality is somewhere between, and there is
evidence to support both claims.56 As will be discussed in Chapter V, this perspective was
consistently reaffirmed during interviews.
This section of literature review serves as the basis for examining the issue of narcotics
trafficking in Kyrgyzstan under the discipline of Geography. As noted, existing literature within
the discipline on the Eurasian narcotics trade is minimal; literature from other disciplines proves
useful, albeit almost equally scant in its coverage of the subject. In terms of relating this
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literature to the survey-site, there are several key points which should be addressed. Foremost,
Kyrgyzstan proves a relevant case study for assessing the geography of narcotics trafficking and
responses, as well as the subsequent influence of these processes on state capacity, due to its
situation along a major trafficking route. It is a comparatively safe and open field site where the
issue is pertinent, and methods such as semi-structured interviews with officials remain feasible.
Furthermore, this section of literature review should make clear that examining the role of
narcotics trafficking – and broader illicit activities at that – is a worthwhile endeavor within
Geography given how these processes shape and are shaped by space and state, fall under a
major research lacunae, and may prove useful to regionally-focused policy development efforts.
Finally, while the state doubtless plays a major role in trafficking in Eurasia, key discourses in
existing literature necessitate a brief exploration of the role of non-state actors in trafficking
processes.
Insurgents, Criminals, and Terrorists
Within broader discourses of involvement of non-state actors in narcotics trafficking,
there are several key themes which are relevant to examine in the context of this research.
Foremost is the role of “lootable resources,” in the onset and sustainment of violent armed
conflict. Key literature on civil war onset often ties the presence of these resources to conflict
onset and sustainment – particularly as factions struggle to control and profit from these
resources. While gemstones and hydrocarbon deposits are typically assessed in this regard, areas
under narcotics cultivation and/or major trafficking routes have likewise proved an important
consideration for social scientists studying the relationship between resources and conflict
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onset.57 In the context of this thesis, there are several important takeaways from this literature,
including competition between non-state actors over the “resource,” of areas under cultivation
and trafficking routes, as well as the link between these “lootable resources,” issues with state
capacity, and concerns over conflict onset. Compared with neighboring states such as Tajikistan
and Afghanistan, Kyrgyzstan experiences few issues with regard to violent competition over
narcotics resources. Nonetheless, narcotics trafficking plays a major role in government
corruption and undermines the legitimacy of a state which has historically struggled with
legitimacy and capacity since independence. Furthermore, in the case of Kyrgyzstan violent nonstate actors derive a key source of rents from trafficking and other illicit activities - often to a
degree that allows them to engage in official politics. 58 To paraphrase Clausewitz’s dictum, in
Kyrgyzstan crime is merely “politics by other means.” 59
To that effect, it is also necessary to examine the various manners by which involvement
by violent non-state actors in the narcotics trade is characterized. Scholarship originating from
Military and Security Studies is useful in this regard. A key example of this is the idea of the
“insurgent-criminal nexus.”60 Employed across a range of contexts – albeit often with deference
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to Islamist militants – the nexus typology essentially argues that violent non-state actors such as
insurgent or terrorist groups will cooperate with organized criminal elements in order to obtain
funding and/or achieve tactical and strategic goals. In one sense, this characterization is intuitive
and has several examples across a range of contexts associated with narcotics trafficking –
including the Peruvian Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso; SL), the M19 Movement, and the
Taliban (excluding 1999 and 2000), among others. 61 With this in mind, taken to its logical
extreme this characterization can become facile if not vapid – utilized for the purposes of fear
mongering and propaganda within dialogues of security and securitization. Therefore, it is
critical to view the concept of a “nexus,” with specific context, history, space, and place in mind
to avoid falling into this trap.
A more intuitive iteration of this concept is advanced by Brad Nicholson and Arnie
Hammari, who argue that violent non-state actors and organized criminal groups exist along a
spectrum – alternatively a “continuum” - and move as needed between political and criminal
activities in terms of necessity, expediency, and sustainment. 62 In supporting their case, the
authors cite African al Qaeda franchises such as al Shabaab in Somalia and al Qaeda in the
Islamic Maghreb as examples of groups who routinely shift their activities between crime such
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as smuggling and kidnapping, insurgency, and terrorism.63 This characterization of such activity
is well represented within a number of other examples globally encompassing everything from
narcotics and antiquities trafficking to hostage taking and cigarette and oil smuggling. 64 The
concept of a spectrum is particularly applicable to Kyrgyzstan, where in addition to occasional
violence, criminal organizations often engage in a wide range of licit and illicit activities, from
politics and legitimate business ventures to trafficking in narcotics and other goods. 65
While these conceptualizations of linkages between crime and terrorism prove useful in
terms of analyzing existing discourses on the relationship between crime, political violence, and
state capacity, Kyrgyzstan presents a difficult case study considering comparatively minimal
political violence in relation to many traditional cases. It is thus more expedient to adapt the
nexus and spectrum models to the Republic in terms of crime and politics. On one hand,
individuals affiliated with the state can be directly observed cooperating with or facilitating
criminal activity. On the other, rather than a nexus such state elites and criminals can be thought
of as engaging in a spectrum of licit and illicit activities to further their own objectives –
financial or political. This includes corruption and kleptocracy, but also extends to narcotics
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trafficking. During their tenure in power, the Bakiev family proved a notable example of this –
shuttering the State Drug Control Agency (SDCA) due to their alleged ties to trafficking run by
members of the vory-v-zakone (literally “thieves in law”). Alternatively, Bayman Erkinbaev –
described as the first drug kingpin of Kyrgyzstan – began his criminal career as a street thug and
gradually came to be one of the most powerful criminals in the country in addition to becoming a
popular political figure in the south. This was in-part facilitated by Kyrgyz politicians seeking to
balance the power and influence of organized crime affiliated with ethnic Uzbeks in the south. 66
As Kupatadze alleges, this fits within a broader pattern of state-crime collusion in many
countries of the former Soviet Union.67
Granted, this issue is not confined to the Kyrgyz Republic. All neighboring coregionalists experience similar issues under different circumstances – whether direct state
criminality in Tajikistan or widespread and deep-seated corruption that predominates the
governments and political apparatuses of the region. This will be explored to a greater degree in
Chapter V – namely in regard to how such criminality impacts state capacity. Before proceeding,
however, it is necessary to examine concepts of state capacity and how they apply to Kyrgyzstan.
Defining the State
Defining the state is as important to this thesis as defining state capacity. In many ways
the former precludes the latter. As such, this section of literature review will briefly detail several
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conceptions of state and stateness deemed relevant to this research. These include discussions of
state and nation, as well as discussions of territory, typologies of state failure, and de-facto states.
In any discussion of stateness, it is critical to highlight the difference between nation,
state, and nation state. Benedict Anderson provides arguably the best and most widely-cited
definition of nation – “an imagined community which is both limited and sovereign.” 68 As will
be discussed in the next section, states are typically defined in terms of their capacity.
Traditionally, states are envisioned in Weberian terms: a set of political and bureaucratic
institutions which governs a sovereign territorial entity through a legitimate monopoly on
coercion by force.69 States are likewise often conceived as entities which provide services and
maintain rule-of-law within the territory they control.70 In International Relations, a state
typically denotes a Westphalian entity which holds a degree of internal and external sovereignty
over a defined territory with a permanent population. Finally, the nation-state project seeks to
align the boundaries of the state and the nation. 71
Within Political Geography, state theory has a contentious history owing to its roots in
social Darwinism and its role in the rise of Nazism. After the Second World War, the
subdiscipline experienced a lull in regard to state theory. The end of the Cold War reinvigorated
68
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the discussion, however. 72 New, critical discussions of state and territory were strongly
influenced by preceding developments in Marxist and Feminist Geographies, and came to
encompass a number of issues tied to territory ranging from globalization to the redrawing of
boundaries and emergence of new forms of state and territory. 73 There are several key threads to
this literature, one of which challenged the continued relevance of the state as an entity. In brief,
the end of the Cold War resulted in significant speculation that the processes of globalization
would gradually reduce the importance of the nation-state as the primary actor in geopolitics and
international relations.74 Other scholarship in critical geography has challenged these
globalization and deterritorialization narratives, in essence arguing that the frenzied discussions
of globalization and deterritorialization which occurred following the collapse of the Soviet
Union – particularly within news-media outlets – displayed little cognizance of the reality of the
nature of both globalization and the Westphalian system. 75 Ongoing discussions in the
subdiscipline have refuted the notion of the “death,” of the state – instead claiming the value of
territory as a resource – with some discussions going as far to argue for the incorporation of
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vertical volume into conceptualizations of territory.76 Taylor specifically conceptualizes the state
as a territorial container – to be used for war-making and defense, economic development,
nationalism, social welfare, and political activities. 77
Failed state literature also provides useful paradigms for examining state and territory.
This includes work by Jean-Germain Gros, who seeks a more nuanced typology of failed states,
as well as Pal Kolstø, who examines how quasi-states exist in a state of limbo between statehood
and lack thereof. Gros’ conceptualization of failed states is imagined around five typologies of
failed states: the anarchic, the mirage, the anemic, the captured, and the in-vitro. 78 By contrast,
Kolstø focusses on quasi-states – state projects which exist in some form as territorial entities but
have otherwise failed to receive international recognition. Conditions in quasi-states often mirror
those of the various typologies of failed state discussed by Gros, with several notable
exceptions.79 Why Nations Fail also provides a foundational work in state-failure literature,
arguing that historical precedents play a key role in shaping the future of a state; likewise, a
state’s economic and political institutions are symbiotically linked and one cannot succeed
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without the success of another – with success defined as inclusive institutions. 80 The final key
thread to examine within literature on state failure is critical scholarship – which challenges the
underlying assumptions and narratives surrounding state failure through Marxist and feminist
discourses. Overarching themes within this literature involve critiques of the use of body and
disease narratives for describing state failure, the role and responsibility of outside entities for
state failure, and the weaponization of the term as a tool to serve specific geopolitical interests. 81
This critical discourse provides an important contrast to scholarship on state failure which
focuses on policies rather than structures.
How then is the state defined in the context of the Kyrgyz Republic? This research adopts
the approach that a single typology of state in the context of discussing capacity in the Republic
is simplistic and lacks nuance. Instead, it is more useful to examine Kyrgyzstan as a state which
embodies a range of characteristics embodied within various typologies of state. This includes
aspects of licit, Westphalian, nation-state, territorial containers envisioned by scholarship in
International Relations and Political Geography as well as aspects of illicit, failed, and quasistates. In the former regard, Kyrgyzstan possesses international sovereignty, a consistent
population, and nominal control over its territory. While not ethnically homogenous to the point
of some post-Soviet states, it nonetheless strives to be titular nation-state entity based on shared
conceptions of culture, history, and national identity among ethnic Kyrgyz. 82
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Considering the latter, Kyrgyzstan embodies aspect of state failure and quasi-stateness,
from the involvement of state elites in criminal enterprise to widespread institutional corruption
and struggles to maintain sovereignty over territory. Granted, this does not mean that the
Republic is at risk of state failure, but merely that the state and its institutions exhibit some
characteristics of failed and quasi-states. Understanding these non-binary typologies of state
embodied by Kyrgyzstan provides the basis for deeper inquiry – namely examining the larger
issues of narcotics trafficking and state capacity in the Republic.
Defining State Capacity
The crux of this thesis is understanding the various inputs to narcotics trafficking and
subsequent responses in the Kyrgyz Republic. This research is ultimately concerned with the role
of this transnational process in questions of state capacity in Southwest and Central Asia. As
such, it is necessary to review existing literature detailing state capacity in order to define what
“state capacity,” means in the context of political geography. In seeking a broad-based
understanding of the term, it was deemed relevant to review literature in economics, political
science, development studies, and other fields. While this is not an exhaustive review of
literature on state capacity, it nonetheless provides a basis for understanding the term in the
context of this research.
Within political geography, there are several competing conceptions of state capacity. A
key thread within these conceptualizations is that many of them assert that state capacity is a
construct rather than a given; capacity is not inherent within the state entity, but rather must be
built and is reliant on territory as a resource through which this process is accomplished. It is
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likewise conceived of as performative in nature – ultimately designed to reproduce the power of
the state at various scales.83 While such conceptions of capacity are rooted in critical theory,
critical theorists often fail to consider the key role that culture plays in reconstructing the state. 84
This is particularly true of nationalism and citizenship, as well as identity more broadly.
Sallie Marston argues these are typically conceived as subordinate to the state itself; they are
fundamental to the production of states and stateness. 85 In assessing these concepts, Marston
cites Joe Painter, whose conception of states combines the Weberian monopoly and the
institutionalization of “spatialized social practices.” 86 Painter furthermore argues that the
formation of a state is inherently cultural.87 These processes include the recognition that state
processes are symbolic, material, and organizational, that the “production of meaning is critical
to the progress of state development,” and that state activities are performed by agents of the
state including government functionaries and everyday citizens.88
Alex Jeffrey’s work on the Brčko district of Bosnia-Herzegovina provides a prescient
example of efforts to cultivate capacity manifesting in a post-conflict environment. Brčko sits in
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Eastern Bosnia-Herzegovina, bounded by Croatia, the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and
Republika Srpska. As a result of international arbitration and the Dayton Peace Accords, it was
established as a “neutral and multi-ethnic district,” of Bosnia-Herzegovina following inter-ethnic
conflict in the 1990s.89 The key challenge in the district following the peace deal was cultivating
capacity – specifically creating a “coherent social container,” in the aftermath of the urbicide and
ethnic cleansing which occurred during the war. 90 In short, district authorities sought to cultivate
cultural capacity in order to entice citizens to think in terms of the district rather than their ethnic
identity.91 These efforts manifest spatially through dual-language street signs and home numbers,
renaming of streets to embody a shared Yugoslav identity and past, and even the creation of a
holiday celebrating the district. These efforts to cultivate capacity are both performative and
banal.92 While these efforts were met with backlash - graffiti and vandalism - Brčko District is
viewed by Alex Jeffrey as a model for generating capacity at a local scale. 93 Beyond demonstrating
the inherently cultural aspect of state capacity, Jeffrey intimates two further notions regarding the
political-geographic basis for capacity: the idea of the territorial container and the idea of
performative capacity. While the former concept has been discussed in the previous section, the
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latter adds a dimension to discussions of capacity which is often overlooked in other literatures but
is critical to conceptualizing capacity.
The container envisioned by Taylor as well as aspects of performativity envisioned by
Painter and Jeffrey are innately tied to the territory of the Kyrgyzstan. In this sense territory serves
as an inherent base for nationalism. While the south may be geographically and administratively
disconnected from the north, this nationalist sentiment permeates both regions down to a local
scale. This manifests in the banal and the deliberate – from statues of Manas to language laws and
other policies that actively discriminate against minority populations. 94 This ethno-nationalism
likewise served as a driving force behind intercommunal violence in 1990 and 2010.
Beyond performing nationalism, the fundamental question when discussing performativity
in the context of state capacity is, can the state act like a state? This raises further lines of
questioning, including what it means to act like a state, which capacities are associated with
stateness and how are they measured, and what actions are taken by states which can be construed
as performative in nature. The concept of performativity has roots in feminist gender theory,
namely the work of Judith Butler.95 In political geography, it offers an equally valuable framework
– in this case for exploring the behavior and capacity of states in the spaces which they control or
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seek to control.96 As has been demonstrated, control of spaces and landscapes play a key role in
the performative capacity of the state. This is especially true in the context of the urban, as
illustrated by Jeffrey.97 Post-socialist urbanism in the former Soviet Union also serves as an
excellent case study in the performative capacity of states – particularly state efforts to cultivate
new nationalisms from the banal.98 The latter concept will be further explored in Chapter III.
Critical geographers and scholars of political violence likewise offer valuable input in discussing
how states engage in performative capacity through discussions of security, or how non-state
actors perform capacity through provision of services and governance of captured or controlled
territory.99
Beyond discussions of capacity outright, further work by political geographers offers
useful frameworks for assessing capacity, particularly that John Agnew’s work on sovereignty
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regimes.100 This is especially considering that the notion of sovereignty – internal and external –
is inherent in commonplace conceptions of capacity. Agnew founds his argument by critiquing
dichotomous conceptualizations of state power as despotic and infrastructural power – the former
of which is the power of the state over society and the latter of which is the power of the state to
penetrate, coordinate, and coopt civil society through the infrastructure of power. 101 Agnew’s
alternative envisioning of power argues:
“What is needed, therefore, is a typology of the main ways in which sovereignty
is currently exercised to take account of: (1) its social construction; (2) its
association with hierarchical subordination; and (3) its deployment in territorial
and non-territorial forms. The two basic dimensions to the typology are defined
by the relative strength of the central state authority (state despotic power) on one
axis and its relative consolidation in the state territoriality (state infrastructural
power) on the other.”102
Building on this notion, Agnew envisions four historically rooted regime types which
have come to dominate conceptions of capacity and sovereignty in the modern era. The first is
the “classic,” Westphalian sovereignty regime, under which infrastructural and despotic power
are territorially bounded. This is followed by the “imperialist,” sovereignty regime, under which
infrastructural power is weak and territoriality and despotic power are in question. The
“integrative,” regime is best described as a federal-style or EU-style sovereignty regime with
infrastructural and despotic power distributed at various levels. Finally, the “globalist,” regime is
embodied by a regime which relies on military capacity, international institutions, and hegemony
to shape the global order through coercion or consensus, i.e. a superpower or hyperpower state
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such as the United States.103 Agnew’s strongest example of these regimes is demonstrated
through extensive review of currency practices in China, the United States, the European Union,
and Latin America.104 He concludes by arguing that sovereignty does not exist solely under the
territorially bounded Westphalian system, and that there is “political authority beyond the
sovereign construction of territorial space.”105 The final line of Agnew’s discussion on
sovereignty is key in that it links the concepts of sovereignty and capacity; just as there is no
singular sovereignty regime, there is no singular capacity regime. Furthermore, considering that
a lion’s share of capacity literature is grounded on the notion of sovereignty – especially in the
Westphalian context – it can be argued that some manner of sovereignty is a precursor for
capacity, and that a firm understanding of sovereignty regimes is likewise critical to assessing
capacity.106
Under Agnew’s framework of sovereignty and capacity, the Kyrgyz Republic falls under
the category of a classic sovereignty regime; power and infrastructural capacity are territorially
bounded. The south, particularly Batken Oblast, is the site of challenges to sovereignty in the
form of territorial enclaves and exclaves of neighboring states, as well as a general sentiment of
disconnectedness from the political and economic power in the north. Threats to Kyrgyzstan’s
sovereignty are far more likely to come from within than from neighbors. In this sense,
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Kyrgyzstan’s capacity suffers from internal challenges as a result of physical geography and
territorial organization – mountains and exclaves, respectively – rather than direct state-state
contest. Arguably a more important takeaway from Agnew’s assessment of capacity through
sovereignty regimes is that inherent within Westphalian concepts of sovereignty is the notion of
control of territory. Thus, Kyrgyzstan’s internal territorial sovereignty should be considered as a
key metric when assessing the capacity of the state.
One final work in political geography serves as a bridge between political-geographic
conceptions of state capacity and sociological, economic, and political science-oriented
conceptions of capacity. Counter to many “neo-Weberian scholars,” Jim Glassman argues that
capacity of the state is defined as the ability and willingness of state elites to facilitate
international flows of capital.107 Glassman’s argument is fundamentally tied to the notion of
deterritorialization and globalization, and relies on the notion that capital and state-elites are nolonger confined or explicitly tied to the distinct territorial units of states.
Glassman’s argument of regressive capacity seems well-suited for Kyrgyzstan. Following
independence, Kyrgyzstan came to be characterized as the “Switzerland of the East.” 108 An
analogy which swapped the Alps for the Tian Shan, it mirrored the “island of democracy,”
rhetoric vaunted in Western circles and by the Kyrgyz government itself. Kyrgyzstan grew to
resemble Switzerland in more ways than one, however, becoming a destination for international
money laundering. Kyrgyzstan’s own Asia Universal Bank was a chief offender for handling
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both foreign dirty money as well as cash pilfered from foreign aid and state coffers. 109 By
Glassman’s definition of capacity, what appears to many as a kleptocratic backwater is in fact a
highly capable state; elites actively pursued policies which facilitated international capital flows
to and from the Republic. The same elites tended to benefit directly from such policies if they
weren’t the ones laundering the money themselves – as was the case with the Bakiev
administration.110
Still, Glassman’s definition of capacity proves limited in two regards despite offering a
useful framework for considering capacity. Foremost, the ability to facilitate capital flows in
some regards relies upon capacity as a precondition - some degree of internal and external
sovereignty as well as social or political institutions. When applying Glassman’s definition, it
furthermore becomes clear that the reality of the situation is considerably more nuanced. For
example, by Glassman’s definition both Nigeria and Transnistria could be argued as having
“capacity.” Yet one contains an international financial hub – Lagos – whereas the other is a
quasi-state supported by Russia and known for chicken smuggling. 111 Furthermore, in the context
of Central Asia, Glassman’s conceptualization of capacity seems counterintuitive. While states
do have “capacity,” to facilitate international flows of capital, these are often one-way flows
from abroad into the pockets of kleptocratic elites. Phrased differently, “capacity,” in Central
Asia does not exist to benefit of global hyper-capitalism, but rather it exists to benefit local elites
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and their patronage networks. With regards to the latter point, Glassman’s measures of capacity
often directly undermine traditional measures of capacity.
Considering, the work in political geography on capacity, this thesis thus proposes an
ideation of capacity as a spectrum with regressive and progressive aspects. A state performing
the duties of a state – providing utilities or services, maintaining rule-of-law and territorial
sovereignty, defending territory – could thus be considered progressive aspects of capacity.
Comparatively, state facilitation of capital flows and associated corruption can be viewed as
regressive considering they diminish the public legitimacy and functional competency of a state.
As capacity is explored further through other social science disciplines, this progressiveregressive scale will serve as the framework for assessing further aspects of capacity.
Beyond the scope of political geography, Charles Tilly provides foundational framework
for conceptualizing capacity, oft-cited by economists and other social scientists.112 Theorizing
governments as racketeers, he argues that the state-system is a byproduct of elites warring to
accumulate capital.113 Tilly’s concept of states argues that proto-modern European states sought
capacity prior to their codification as modern territorial entities. Like Agnew, Tilly uses a fourpart definition to capacity. Tilly’s basis for capacity is conceived as follows:
“Under the general heading of organized violence, the agents of states
characteristically carry on four different activities:
1. Warmaking: eliminating or neutralizing their own rivals outside the territories in
which they have clear and continuous priority as wielders of force
2. Statemaking: eliminating or neutralizing their rivals inside those territories
3. Protection: eliminating or neutralizing the enemies of their clients
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4. Extraction: acquiring the means of carrying out the first three activities:
warmaking, statemaking, and protection.”114
Tilly continues, noting that extraction – which modern theorists of capacity often view in terms
of taxes – relies on a state’s monopoly on coercive force. Furthermore, each aspect of capacity is
innately tied to the development of state institutions from militaries, police, and intelligence
services to administrative and tax bureaucracies. Considering the critical nature of the
scholarship and the emphasis on use-of-force, it is little wonder Tilly utilizes organized crime as
an analogue for state-building. Both are built on coercive extraction of capital and use of
violence.115 Likewise, it is unsurprising that this theory of state building and state capacity is
considered in terms of predation.116 Like Agnew, though, Tilly notes that his framework for
assessing the development of states – and by extension their capacity – is not a universal model
considering its reliance on Europe as a primary case study. 117
Building on Glassman’s model of regressive capacity, Tilly’s model can be construed as
staunchly regressive considering it models capacity as designed to extract rents for the purpose
of perpetuating conflict and benefiting select clients. Within Kyrgyzstan, political patronage
networks bear strong resemblance to the second, third, and fourth aspects of Tilly’s model.
While only the Bakiev regime was directly implicated in assassinating political opponents, each
post-independence regime in Kyrgyzstan has embodied these aspects of capacity in some form or
another, whether through wide-ranging corruption scandals or harassment and targeting of

114

Tilly, 15.

115

Tilly, “Warmaking and Statemaking.”

116

Cameron G. Thies, “Conflict, Geography, and Natural Resources: The Political Economy of State Predation in
Africa,” Polity 41, no. 4 (October 2009): 465–88, https://doi.org/10.1057/pol.2008.32.
117

Tilly, “Warmaking and Statemaking.”

42

political opponents and civil society organizations.118 Granted, this model is more germane in
neighboring Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, which both share histories of severe repression and
extensive state criminality. In this regard, Tilly’s model of state formation as organized crime
addresses several of the key flaws of Glassman’s model.
Nonetheless, there are critical shortcomings to Tilly’s framework. Foremost, it fails to
emphasize territory as a critical resource for states beyond strategic considerations. Territory is a
critical component of state formation and state capacity; it is ultimately a precursor for all
aspects of Tilly’s model – particularly rent extraction. The institutions established to extract rents
are inherently reliant on the territory possessed by the state as a basis for extracting rent in the
form of taxes or resources. While this is hinted in Tilly’s emphasis on internal and external
sovereignty as critical components of state efforts to generate capacity, it lacks the emphasis of a
political geographer. The other key critique of Tilly’s model of regressive capacity is that it fails
to acknowledge the performative aspects of state-building – primarily those tied to nationalism.
While the concept of nation may have lacked resonance in the early period of Tilly’s survey, by
the early 19th century it was destined to play a determinative role in the modern territorial
organization of Europe. Likewise, nationalism served as a guiding doctrine in the establishment
of modern European empires, themselves designed to improve the rent extraction and
geostrategic capacities of the metropole.
Tilly and Glassman’s models of capacity imply a broader disconnect between politicalgeographic models of capacity and those found in other social sciences, which tend to focus on
the technical aspects of state capacity over the territorial and performative. In fact, in Kyrgyzstan
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and the surrounding Republics, territory and performance have played a critical role in
cultivating the capacity of the post-Soviet state. Territory serves as a resource by and through
which the states of the region can extract the rent required to cultivate capacity. It likewise serves
as stage for capacity to be performed – often through gilded urban development, banal
monuments, and efforts within currency and state-symbols to engender the notion of a nationstate tied to specific aspects of place and territory. 119
Despite such shortcomings, Tilly and Glassman present a compelling argument for
considering state-capacity in terms of a progressive-regressive spectrum closely tied to rent
extraction and movement of capital. Tilly’s broader work has likewise played a played a key
theories of capacity within economics and political science, which often conceive of capacity in
terms of the ability to levy taxes, enforce contracts and property rights, and regulate
commerce.120 While lacking with regard to a broader concept of capacity, the fiscal view of
capacity is worth exploring given it is often regarded a fundamental aspect of state capacity and
the quality of “stateness.”
Besley and Persson, for example, argue that state capacity is defined by the ability of the
state to enforce contracts - “legal capacity,” - as well as the ability of the state to levy taxes and
spend them on public goods - termed “fiscal capacity.” 121 Under this framework, Besley and
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Persson argue that the ability to cultivate legal and fiscal capacity - i.e. the ability to enforce
contracts and levy taxes for public goods - are critical to broader development of state capacity
and the broader success nation-state as a whole.122 In a subsequent article, Besley and Persson
present the idea of capacity simply as the ability of a state to “implement a range of policies,”
based on the constraints of a state’s fiscal and legal capacity. 123 In tying implementational ability
and economic development to fiscal and legal capacity, the authors likewise critique work in
economics which fails to link these aspects of capacity – particularly in cases of weak or fragile
states.124 In their estimation, a lack of legal capacity contributes to both lackluster economic
growth and the risk of civil conflict onset. Tangentially, a lack of fiscal capacity results in low
incomes.125 While the work of Besley and Persson seemingly provides important aspects for the
overall consideration of capacity, like Tilly and Glassman it remains divorced from the
importance of territory and nationalism. The authors thus acknowledge the simplicity of their
model, further noting that it fails to account for the importance of political and social institutions
as they pertain to capacity.126
Whereas Besley and Persson intimate the relevance of history and institutions as they
pertain to capacity, Acemoglu and Robinson provide an entire book on the subject in Why
Nations Fail. Over the course of the book, the authors rely on a number of historical and
contemporary case studies in order to demonstrate the causes of state failure. In relying on these
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cases, they demonstrate several things. Foremost, state capacity or lack thereof is inexorably
linked to the nature of the economic and political institutions which govern a given country.
Acemoglu and Robinson assert that institutions which are politically and economically inclusive
trend toward higher levels of success and capacity. In contrast, institutions which are repressive,
and extractive coincide with low levels of capacity and/or state failure. In relating this work to
Besley and Persson, it can be argued that inclusive institutions as defined by Acemoglu and
Robinson typically involve legal capacity wherein contracts can be enforced by governments.
Higher levels of capacity also involve governments which largely pursue public interest when it
comes to policy - an extension of fiscal capacity in the sense that tax revenues are utilized to
benefit the largest number of citizens.127
Acemoglu and Robinson likewise incorporate specific concepts from political geography
when crafting their conception of capacity. Primarily is the notion of political centralization.
Examining the concept in the context of Somalia, they argue that the abject lack of political
centralization has resulted in a state devoid of capacity. 128 This argument is couched in the notion
that the lack of political centralization was fundamentally tied to the unwillingness of some elites
to subject themselves to the control of others; rather than developing a centralized political core
and a political periphery governed by the core, Somalia remained entirely periphery. 129 The
result of a lack of political centralization is weak state capacity - particularly in the fiscal and
legal sense. Despite this passing reference to political geography, however, Acemoglu and
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Robinson likewise downplay the role of territory and nationalism in their conceptualization of
capacity.
In reviewing Besley and Persson and Acemoglu and Robinson, as conceived by
economists, state capacity is defined as the ability of the state to exact taxation for public benefit
and enforce contracts and/or property rights, and pursue policy goals. These measures raise
questions about the capacity of the Kyrgyz state. Key considerations in this regard include the
difficulties of centralization and rent extraction in the form of taxes, as well as exclusive
economic and political institutions enveloped in the politics of kinship and patronage. 130 Tilly’s
characterization of state making as organized crime likewise rings salient, given evidence of
close links between state-elites and organized crime in the Republic. 131 These kinship and
patronage networks and a strong state-crime nexus all impede spending in the good of the
general populace in favor of preferential corruption. Finally, under the economic model of
capacity Kyrgyzstan’s ongoing political challenges and struggles are directly tied to its struggles
to cultivate capacity – which are in-turn a facet of structural issues with its economic and
political institutions as well as the legacies of Soviet control.
Many frameworks of state capacity originating in Political Science also adopt fiscal and
legal notions of capacity. There is some work, however, that builds upon or challenges this
paradigm. Cullen S. Hendrix notes lacunae of a specific definition of capacity beyond the notions
of Weberian monopoly, policy enactment, provision of services, and tax collection, for
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example.132 With regards to conflict onset, he asserts that measures of capacity which emphasize
regime type place certain regimes at higher risk of civil conflict, but prove poor predictors of
conflict outcome.133 This in mind, Hendrix proposes an alternative set of measures which
emphasize three meta-aspects of capacity: rational legality, rentier-autocraticness, and neopatrimonality.134 Rational legality assumes that a democratic state possesses more effective and
efficient bureaucratic institutions whereas autocracies exhibit opposite characteristics. 135 Rentierautocraticness is an index spanning high-rent autocracies on one end to resource-poor
democracies on the other.136 Neo-patrimoniality is defined by Hendrix as an index bounded by
“monarchies where the monarch is the direct beneficiary of the country’s natural resource wealth
(Bahrain, Oman, and Kuwait).”137 On the opposite end of this spectrum are resource-poor
democracies.138 The conclusion that these qualities constitute measures of state capacity is
supported by Hendrix’s analysis of civil-conflict onset in 101 countries from 1984-1989.
This analysis concludes that the countries on the bottom end of these spectrums are typically
more vulnerable to civil conflict onset, whereas countries at the top are less vulnerable. More
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importantly, Hendrix concludes that fiscal capacity is significantly correlated with all three
considerations.139
In a separate analysis, Hendrix incorporates terrain modeling into his efforts to discern
capacity, which he notes is a critical consideration for assessing the fiscal and bureaucratic
capacity of states.140 Hendrix’s assessment views rough terrain – such as mountains – as a key
impediment to the bureaucratic and fiscal capacities of states in the sense that ensures that a.) tax
collection is more difficult and b.) tax collection is costlier. As a result, states with territoriallydiminished capacity are viewed as more susceptible to civil conflict onset. 141 This analysis is
also uniquely valuable among other literature in the sense that it incorporates an aspect of
territory – terrain – into concepts of capacity. Still, both of Hendrix’s assessments fail to address
nationalism and aspects of performativity as they pertain to capacity.
Nonetheless, Hendrix’s work holds direct relevance to the Kyrgyz Republic in terms of
assessing capacity. Kyrgyzstan is a largely resource-poor democracy which has experienced
longstanding challenges with corruption and bureaucratic effectiveness. In terms of terrain, 90%
of the country lies above 1000 meters in elevation, and the massive peaks of the Tian Shan and
the Pamir bifurcate much of the country. At the same time, there is only an individual tax burden
of approximately 10% across the country.142 By these measures Kyrgyzstan can be considered
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susceptible to conflict based on lacking capacity. Actual instances of internal conflict and
political violence in Kyrgyzstan lend support to this assessment, including inter-ethnic violence
in the 1990s and 2010s, as well as two successive revolutions and several other prominent
instances of political violence.
Aside from Hendrix, Sally N. Cummings and Ole Nørgaard provide a comprehensive
conception of state capacity in the context of Central Asia. 143 Utilizing Kazakhstan and
Kyrgyzstan as case studies for attempts to cultivate capacity in post-Communist states, they
conceptualize for areas through which capacity can be assessed; these include ideational,
political, technical, and implementational capacities.144 In their assessment, the political capacity
of a state is seen as defining effective governance within the context of a given state. This
includes the ability of the state to draft and implement effective policy - termed “horizontal
capacity,” - as well as the ability of the state to both secure resources form domestic and
international society while simultaneously maintaining autonomy during the policy-drafting
process - termed “vertical capacity.”145 Technical capacity simply refers to the resources - both
material and intellectual - which can be brought to bear on behalf of the state. Implementation
capacity denotes the ability of a state to enact policy decisions. 146 Finally, ideational capacity
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indicates how elites function and generate consensus within the state structure - both within the
state apparatus and between the state and its citizens. 147
Their work then applies these concepts of capacity to an analysis of a 2002 survey of 125
mid-level officials in both countries.148 The comparative analysis notes the key similarities
between both countries, including sovereignty and territorial integrity, strong centralized
structures and bureaucracies retained from the Soviet era, direct-rule by the executive, and stateownership of key economic sectors; each state is likewise controlled by its titular nationality. It
also highlights critical differences, including size, economic structures, political liberalization,
and potential sources of rent - including tax bases, natural resource wealth, and foreign aid. 149 In
utilizing interviews to compare the two countries, Cummings and Nørgaard assume that their
respondents represent a small subset as opposed to a sample. They likewise assume that
respondents provided objective responses, and that the respondents position as a mid-level
official provides them with a unique perspective and insight in understanding the machinery of
the state.150
In reviewing interview responses based on Cummings and Nørgaard’s concepts of
capacity, the authors note key differences between Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan pertaining to
official perspectives on measures of capacity. Kazakhstan has seemingly cultivated greater
capacity based on its location, resource wealth, and political centralization. Comparatively,
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Kyrgyzstan’s capacity remains challenged by a lack of resources as well as inter-regional
rivalries and clan affiliations. Both states face major challenges to capacity as a result of
corruption and politicization of bureaucratic apparatuses, Kyrgyzstan especially in the case of the
latter. Finally, Cummings and Nørgaard specifically note the threat posed to capacity in both
states by organized crime - something potentially exacerbated the embrace of Western models of
governance, unfettered free markets, and privatization. 151 In sum, while both states fare arguably
better than their neighbors, each struggle with a unique set of issues when it comes to cultivating
and retaining capacity.
Of the non-geographic literature reviewed, Cummings and Nørgaard provide an excellent
and comprehensive ideation of capacity that expands upon otherwise truncated discourse of
fiscal and legal capacities. Their methodology also proves relevant, as does their focus on
Central Asia as a study site. Importantly, they address several of the key shortcomings of
economic models of capacity by addressing aspects of nationalism, performative capacity, and
territory in their respective discussions of ideational capacity and technical capacity – the latter
being tied to the material resources available to the state within its respective territory. While it
relies on data that is comparatively dated – not reflecting political strife in 2005 and 2010 in
Kyrgyzstan and in 2019 in Kazakhstan – it nonetheless provides a valuable snapshot of the
longstanding issues with capacity in the Kyrgyz Republic. This includes corruption, issues with
political centralization, a lack of exploitable rents, and the role of crime as a key detriment to
state capacity.
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In seeking to advance from competing conceptions of state capacity, what is clear is that
what constitutes “capacity,” is infinitely more nuanced than a single disciplinary approach –
especially in the context of Kyrgyzstan. Perhaps this is the reason “state capacity,” remains an
ill-defined yet often referenced chimera. Thus, the proper approach to defining state capacity in
the context of Kyrgyzstan is the same approach employed when defining the state. Namely,
capacity in the Republic incorporates various elements of literature reviewed into an overall
amalgam. This includes standard-fare conceptions of capacity rooted in economics, political
science, and sociology such as the ability to extract rents, collect taxes, and maintain the
Weberian monopoly. However, it also involves the ability of the state to perform the functions
associated with a state controlling territory as conceived by Taylor, Painter, and Jeffrey.
Importantly, capacity cannot exist without territory, and territory serves as a critical resource for
cultivating capacity. As will be demonstrated in Chapter III, the Republic has struggled with
various aspects of capacity – particularly the political-geographic dimensions of capacity – since
initial independence in 1991. These challenges persist to this day.
Conclusion: Chapter II
This chapter provided a brief overview of literature deemed relevant to this thesis during
research, including work on narcotics trafficking in Eurasia, the linkages between criminals,
state-elites, and non-state actors, and conceptions of state and state capacity. In reviewing this
literature, this section introduces concepts relevant to the remainder of this thesis. Importantly,
this section demonstrates a critical lack of scholarship examining the relationship between drug
trafficking and state capacity in the context of Central Asia broadly, and the Kyrgyz Republic in
particular. With this in mind, the next chapter will provide an overview of the geographic region
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of scope that serves as the focus of this research – with a brief section introducing Central Asia
followed by a detailed discussion of the Kyrgyz Republic as a place and space.
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Chapter III: Site Survey
Beyond reviewing literature, it is critical to provide context of space and place for Central
Asia at large and the Kyrgyz Republic in particular. This section will provide a brief overview
Central Asia, including its composition as well as its global significance as a world region. More
importantly, this section will include extensive discussion of Kyrgyzstan in terms of place and
space. In doing so, this section aims to provide context for discussing fieldwork and findings.
Asie Centrale
As noted in Chapter I, defining “Central Asia,” often proves difficult owing to various
competing terminologies and definitions further complicated by long histories of trade, conquest,
empire, and collapse; in Western scholarship the debate over defining the region dates to the 19 th
and early 20th centuries. Some of the earliest attempts to define Central Asia as a distinct
geographic region were undertaken by early modern geographers. Alexander von Humboldt is
first credited with using the term in his so-named three-volume Asie Centrale, first published in
1843. To this day, it has yet to be translated from the original French. 152 Other competing
terminology has included “Inner Asia,” “High Asia,” and even “High Tataria,” the latter a
reference to the Turkic peoples who played a central role in the region and its conquests from the
Mongols to the Russians.153 These definitions of the region also reflected imperial conquest –
Russian Turkestan, “Soviet Central Asia,” and the “Soviet Orient,” have all been used to denote
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the region as well.154 Other definitions have also focused on the important cultural and historical
urban centers of the region, including Bukhara and Samarqand in present-day Uzbekistan as well
as Merv in present-day Turkmenistan.155
Mackinder’s Pivot
The birth of political geography in the late 19th and early 20th century coincided with a
new ideation of Central Asia. Under the framework of geopolitics, Central Asia grew to be
considered as a critical geostrategic pivot. 156 This idea of “Heartland Theory” was originally put
forth in Sir Halford J. Mackinder in his 1904 article entitled “The Geographical Pivot of
History.” Concerned with the rise of nascent powers including Russia, Germany, and China,
Mackinder presented a theory of space and geopolitical organization which subdivided the world
into three areas – the heartland, the inner crescent, and the outer crescent. 157 Both the heartland
and inner crescent were contained to the Eurasian landmass, which Mackinder termed the “world
island.” Mackinder’s dictum argues:
Who rules East Europe commands the Heartland:
Who rules the Heartland commands the World-Island:
Who rules the World-Island commands the World.158
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Still, in the years between delivering his initial lecture and the initial days of the Cold War,
Mackinder’s ideation of a “world heartland,” occupying Southwest and Central Asia remained
vague and undefined.159
The beginning and end of the Cold War saw the reinvigoration of Mackinder’s dictum. In
the United States, for example, it played a guiding role in the doctrine of containment influencing the likes of Nicholas Spykman and George F. Kennan. Beyond containing the Soviet
Union, Mackinder’s theory emerged as a critical aspect of security discourse on resource
geopolitics. While a wellspring of critical scholarship within Geography emerged on
Mackinder’s work following the end of the Cold War, in other disciplines and popular mediums
the term emerged alongside the idea of globalization in vapid discourse and buzzword
geopolitics – often employing Mackinder’s dictum to advance foreign policy discourse and
geopolitical agendas.160 This discourse has persisted to this day; the coverage of China’s Belt and
Road Initiative provides one such example.161
The key issue with this discourse – beyond a lack of critical engagement of Mackinder is that it diminishes the importance and agency of Central Asia as a region in its own right.
While the region remains strategically important to world powers for its situation between major
world powers and its strategic resource reserves, it likewise possesses its own, unique
geopolitical history predating the Westphalian system. The states of the region are likewise their
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own actors, have played a major role in shaping geopolitical events on a regional and global
scale. Still, the region often remains consigned to Mackinderian discourses. 162
At the Edge of Empire
Territorial organization in its modern form in Central Asia occurred in the early years of
the Soviet Union. Borders were drawn and redrawn several times before the modern territorial
units of Central Asia emerged (See Appendix B). Stalin’s cynical cartography – particularly in
the Ferghana Valley – ensured the titular nationalities of the so-named Soviet Socialist Republics
were distributed across three different countries with little concern for historical and cultural ties
to place.163 Tajikistan presents a particularly egregious example; the new national capital of
Dushanbe was fabricated from a market town whilst the important cultural and historical Tajik
cities of Samarqand and Bukhara were placed in Uzbekistan. 164
The true consequences of Soviet-imperial cartography would present themselves as the
Union collapsed in the early 1990s. Like so many post-colonial states, borders imposed by
outsiders would contribute to internal and interstate conflict in the region; these conflicts
manifested in disputes over political power, land, and resource access, and in the case of
Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan would all be accompanied by violence, including ethnic
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riots, inter-state conflict, and civil war. 165 These outbreaks of violence were concentrated in the
Ferghana Valley, which to this day remains a “tinderbox,” for conflict and disputes over territory
and resources in the region.166 At the eastern end of this “tinderbox,” lies the Kyrgyz Republic
(See Appendix B).
The Kyrgyz Republic as a Place
The Kyrgyz Republic is a small, mostly mountainous country situated in eastern Central
Asia between Kazakhstan, China, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan (See Appendices B and C). A
former Soviet satellite republic, it gained independence with the collapse of the Union in 1991. 167
It holds the distinction of being the only parliamentary democracy in a neighborhood of
strongmen.168 With a population of approximately six million, it is the smallest Central Asian
republic.169 Key economic sectors include agriculture and mineral extraction;

165

Shishkin, Restless Valley; Valery Tishkov, “`Don’t Kill Me, I’m a Kyrgyz!’: An Anthropological Analysis of
Violence in the Osh Ethnic Conflict,” Journal of Peace Research 32, no. 2 (May 1995): 133–49,
https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343395032002002.
166

“Ferghana Valley: A Tinderbox For Violence,” RadioFreeEurope/RadioLiberty, accessed March 17, 2019,
https://www.rferl.org/a/Why_Is_The_Ferghana_Valley_A_Tinderbox_For_Violence/2074849.html; Aksana
Islamibekova and Sophie Roche, “The Glimmer of Hope in Bloody Kyrgyzstan,” Ferghana News, November 8,
2010, http://enews.fergananews.com//article.php?id=2654; Megoran, “Uzbekistan-Kyrgyzstan Boundary”; Nick
Megoran, “The Critical Geopolitics of the Uzbekistan–Kyrgyzstan Ferghana Valley Boundary Dispute, 1999–2000,”
Political Geography 23, no. 6 (August 2004): 731–64, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.polgeo.2004.03.004; Catherine Putz,
“Kyrgyz and Tajiks Clash Along Disputed Border,” August 4, 2015, 2; “Residents of Border Villages of Kyrgyzstan
and Tajikistan in Dispute over Waterpipe,” accessed April 14, 2019, https://akipress.com/news:610965/; “Second
Tajik Villager Killed In Dispute Over Road Near Kyrgyz Border,” RadioFreeEurope/RadioLiberty, accessed April
14, 2019, https://www.rferl.org/a/tajik-villager-killed-in-dispute-over-road-near-kyrgyz-border/29820974.html.
167

Shishkin, Restless Valley.

168

John Anderson, Kyrgyzstan: Central Asia’s Island of Democracy? (Amsterdam, NL: Harwood Academic
Publishers, 1999).
169

Central Intelligence Agency, “Central Asia :: Kyrgyzstan — The World Factbook - Central Intelligence Agency,”
CIA World Factbook, September 26, 2018, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-worldfactbook/geos/kg.html.

59

similar to neighboring Tajikistan, a significant portion of GDP is tied to remittances from
Kyrgyz guest workers in Russia.170
Historically and culturally, there are strong traditions linked to nomadic lifestyle - an
important aspect of national identity. Islam is widespread throughout the country; pockets of
Orthodox Christianity remain - primarily concentrated with populations of ethnic Russians in the
north.171 Russian and Kyrgyz are the official languages, however approximately 14% of the
population also speak Uzbek or another language as a byproduct of internal ethnic
diversity (See Appendices D and E).
Politically, the recent history of the Republic is fraught with intrigue. Since
independence, there have been significant and contentious debates surrounding national identity sometimes resulting in inter-ethnic violence.172 In 2005 and 2010 successive governments were
ousted because of corruption by mass public demonstrations and protests. 173 Following the
Second Kyrgyz Revolution in 2010, there was a period of interim governance which has been
followed by two successive elections in 2011 and 2017. The latter was judged by international
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observers as the most competitive in the country’s history despite charges of widespread votebuying and abuse of public resources.174
As will be discussed, governance and state capacity have been a near-constant challenges
in Kyrgyzstan since initial independence in 1991.These challenges are resultant from the
persistence of clan-based kinship and patronage networks by the political elite, privileging of
select ethnicities by circumstance or by Soviet authorities, and challenging physical geography
which has resulted in a pronounced north/south divide in the country. 175 Alongside rich historical
and cultural traditions, these politics have played a critical role in shaping the Republic as a
space.
A Brief History of Kyrgyzstan
Before examining Kyrgyzstan as a space, it is necessary to further examine the
Kyrgyzstan’s history with a special emphasis on the development of modern Kyrgyz
nationalism. This provides critical context both in terms of defining Kyrgyzstan as a space as
well as assessing the development of the modern Kyrgyz nation and state. In this sense, Kyrgyz
is taken to mean the titular ethnicity for which the republic is named rather than citizens of the
Republic; the Kyrgyz “nationality,” would not emerge in the contemporary sense until after the
region was brought under Russian control in the late 19th century.176
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Mongols, Tsars, and Soviets
The ancestry of the modern Kyrgyz can be traced to the Turkic tribes of Altai and Irtysh,
the Mongols, and the other ancient peoples of the Tian Shan region. 177 The Kyrgyz developed a
shared ethnic consciousness surrounding these very mountains, nomadic pastoralism, and the
epic hero Manas, however this shared sense of ethnicity was not codified into proto-nationalism
until the area fell under Russian control in the 1870s. 178 Russian settlement in the region caused
tensions, which came to a head during widespread violence following Tsar Nicolas II’s
imposition of labor conscription in 1916. An estimated 120,000 Kyrgyz were killed by Russians
while many others fled or perished en-route to western China. 179
Following the Russian Revolution of 1917, the modern state boundaries of Kyrgyzstan
were formally codified – first in 1924 as the Kara-Kirgiz autonomous region of the USSR’s
Turkestan Republic, and then again in 1936 as the Kirgiz Soviet Socialist Republic (See
Appendix C). Despite being so-named for the titular ethnicity around which the state was
constructed, early administration of the Republic was carried out by ethnic Slavs and Tatars
transplanted into the region, despite the initial communist party cadres being mostly ethnic
Kyrgyz.180 While Russification began in earnest during the initial years of Russian rule, it
intensified measurably under Stalin with purges of Kyrgyz cadres and the continued in-migration
of ethnic Slavs, who concentrated around major urban centers of power - such as the capital,
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Frunze.181 This was accompanied the continued out-migration of Kyrgyz nomads to China,
Russian consolidation of power within the Communist Party of Kyrgyzstan, and extensive efforts
by Soviet authorities to eradicate Kyrgyz culture while coopting its symbolism.182 During the
Second World War, Kyrgyzstan also saw the in-migration of other Soviet nationalities and ethnic
groups, including forcibly relocated Volga Germans, Koreans, and Caucasians. 183 From the late
1950s until the late 1980s, the Kyrgyz would only comprise a 40-47% plurality of their so-named
national republic.184
Uzbeks concentrated in the South were not immune to Soviet campaigns of repression
either. Campaigns of religious repression specifically targeted the “regions around the Fergana
Valley where Islam was much stronger and where the old ways retained their influence.” 185
These efforts were met with creative resistance; pilgrimages to the Throne of Solomon
(Sulieman-Too) in Osh “intensified during the Soviet period as an alternative to making haj in
Mecca.”186 The Uzbeks also suffered at the hands of the Kyrgyz, who despite themselves being
deferential to ethnic Russians, politically dominated Uzbek-majority administrative regions in
the south through schemes involving rejiggering of administrative apparatuses to over-represent
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ethnically Kyrgyz constituents.187 By the outbreak of significant interethnic violence in Osh and
the surrounding area in 1990, Uzbeks comprised 26% of the population of Osh oblast but held
only 4% of key government posts in the region. 188 By contrast, Uzbeks controlled up to 80% of
trade and commerce in the region; by the late 1980s this perceived or actual inequality resulted
increased resentment by Kyrgyz struggling with the effects of perestroika.189
Nationalism Rekindled
Modern Kyrgyz nationalism lay dormant until the 1980s, emerging by the end of the
decade with decidedly cultural and economic aspects. One of the most prominent calls for a
rediscovering of national identity came from Kyrgyz novelist Chingiz Aitmatov. Drawing upon
the Epic of Manas, Aitmatov decried decades of Russification in The Day Lasts More than a
Hundred Years (1980). He likened the people of Central Asia to mankurts – unthinking slaves
who have no memories or conceptions of culture, heritage, or self. 190 Aitmatov’s work proved
incisive in the leadup to Soviet collapse. Some ethnically Kyrgyz party officials could not even
address their countrymen in Kyrgyz; a significant portion of urban membership in new
nationalist organizations were similarly “Russified.”191 With increasing pressure and nationalist
sentiment, 1989 saw the adoption of a new language law. Kyrgyz became the official state
language, while Russian was reserved as the language of inter-ethnic communication. By
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contrast, Uzbek was afforded no such provisions. This angered many Uzbek residents of Jalal
Abad and Osh oblasts.192 Implementation of the new law was ultimately banal; the most
significant expression of involved public spaces such as streets and squares being renamed in
Kyrgyz.193 Despite such banality, the new law contributed to the reemergence of long-simmering
ethno-regional tensions between Kyrgyz and Uzbeks.
A key aspect of emerging nationalist sentiment among ethnic Kyrgyz was directly tied to
an economic downturn including rampant rural unemployment, low salaries, and a 1990
economic crisis.194 In the south, unemployment rates rose as high as 23% during this period. 195
With squatter settlements forming on the outskirts of cities by the late 1980s, land reform
movements were organized around alleviating housing concerns by forcing the state to formalize
shantytowns, provide land for construction of new housing, or provide suitable housing to
Kyrgyz migrants arriving in Kyrgyz cities – primarily Frunze and Osh. 196 In arguing for proKyrgyz land reform, the Frunze-based “Ashar” (Solidarity) political organization adopted a
decidedly nationalist tone by exploiting rumors about the reputed plans of the government to
help resettle Armenian refugees from conflict in the South Caucasus. 197 Ashar was eventually
successful in its demands. Acceptance by the government of Ashar likewise established the
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precedent for the founding of over a three-dozen new political organizations within a year, many
explicitly nationalist.198 Ashar would eventually morph into the Democratic Movement of
Kyrgyzstan (DDK). DDK rapidly grew to be one of the largest and most prominent of these
organizations, going from 300 delegates from around the country to over 100,000 members in a
three-month period in 1990. DDK advocated civil society, market-economic reform, sovereignty,
and the reassertion of Kyrgyz history and identity. 199
In Osh the issue of land reform proved more capricious. Local politicians adopted
stridently anti-Uzbek or anti-Kyrgyz rhetoric in arguments over land reform and political
representation, many of which played on economic disparities between Uzbeks and Kyrgyz
which were being reinforced by perestroika’s privatization drive. Ashar’s parallel organization in
Osh, Osh Aimagy, demanded land for economically displaced Kyrgyz families who had recently
arrived in the city. The local party chief appropriated 32 hectares of land from a predominatelyUzbek collective farm, which angered Uzbeks. 200 The Uzbek-nationalist group “Adolat” (Justice)
in-turn aired their longstanding political grievances, demanding greater cultural and political
representation as well as recognition of Uzbek as an official language in south Kyrgyzstan. 201 In
some cases demands included the creation of an Uzbek autonomous region in south Kyrgyzstan
if not outright reunification of Uzbek-majority areas with Uzbekistan. 202 While the ethnoregional cleavages between Kyrgyz and Uzbeks had remained muted during the leadup to
198
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independence, the language law in concert with economic strife and attempts at land reform
proved a catalyst for explosive violence.
Violence and Independence
The image of Kyrgyzstan as a peaceful backwater of the USSR was shattered in early
June of 1990, when an outbreak of intercommunal political violence in Osh between Kyrgyz and
Uzbeks resulted in several hundred casualties. 203 While the local KGB office had warned of
tensions, the warning went ignored by officials. Fighting between local youths – which had been
sporadic - quickly devolved into violent rioting across the region following an altercation at the
bazaar and bus station in nearby Uzgen.204 Riots began on June 4th and intensified quickly; they
came to involve participation by local police on behalf of their respective ethnicity, as well as
looting, destruction of property, rape, and murder in both Osh and Uzgen as well as the
surrounding countryside.205 Harkening to the Israelites of yore, some Kyrgyz were instructed to
paint their doors red in order to spare their homes and property from destruction. 206 Rioting was
finally halted on June 8th by Soviet paratroopers, who deployed within hours of initial violence
with orders to use lethal force to quell the violence, if necessary. 207
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At the conclusion of violence, official estimates placed casualties at between 200 and
600, however unofficial estimates allege up to 1,000 killed. 208 The aftermath of the riots resulted
in 4,000 investigated incidents, with 3,125 officially registered crimes. 209 Young men perpetrated
a majority of the violence, many of whom were allegedly intoxicated during the rioting. 210 While
the riots were officially investigated by a court and saw 48 prosecutions with 46 convictions –
primarily convictions of ethnic Kyrgyz for violent crimes, they nonetheless are viewed as
establishing the precedent for the 2010 violence in Osh following the ouster of President Bakiev
– if not being a direction continuation of the 1990s.211 Finally, despite the violence – which was
predicated upon economic grievances as well as strong ethno-nationalist undertones – clan,
tribal, and regional loyalties and patronage networks continued to dominate Kyrgyz politics in
the early 1990s despite nascent nationalism. 212
Following the 1990 riots, a series of other challenges presented themselves in
Kyrgyzstan. The ouster of then-Secretary of the Communist Party of Kyrgyzstan - Absamat
Masaliyev – was hastened by the 1990 riots in his home city of Osh. Efforts to oust Masaliyev
also demonstrated further ethno-regional cleavages among the ruling elite. 213 The traditionally-
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powerful Osh-bloc of southern elites faced new challenges from the Naryn-bloc of the east. 214
Southern elites, concerned with their diminishing power, advocated devolution and power
sharing schemes including the administrative restructuring of the republic into a northern and
southern region with equal representation in legislative bodies. Other schemes called for further
devolution and dissolution of power ranging from a federation of two coequal republics to the
creation of five autonomous regions within the republic – one for each oblast at the time – under
a confederation coordinated by a rotating presidency. 215 As Eugene Huskey notes:
“The advocates of devolution and power-sharing are motivated less by a desire
to promote regional social and economic development than to protect local
political networks.”216
Beyond exposing regional cleavages, the early 1990s also exposed major urban-rural divides
within the political structure of the country. The 1990 Osh riots were a partial manifestation of
this. Furthermore, while Russified, urban Kyrgyz based in Frunze remained in firm control of the
political apparatus and nationalist movement by 1992, they were nonetheless perceived as
vulnerable to non-urban nationalists and populists. 217 In both cases, the proliferation of political
parties ensured difficulties in maintaining a multiethnic ruling coalition. 218 The Osh events of
1990 in concert with “political infighting,” between regionally aligned blocs – primarily Osh and
Naryn – forced the government to schedule elections for October. 219
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Nineteen Ninety saw the election of Askar Akaev – the first non-CPK member to be
elected President of the Republic.220 With a background in physics, mathematics, and academia,
he stood as a stark contrast to his predecessor.221 Akaev supported some aspects of perestroika,
despite the potentially negative ramifications for the Kyrgyz economy. 222 He likewise backed
Gorbachev during the 1991 coup attempt, declaring independence immediately following the
coup - having declared Kyrgyzstan sovereign less than a year prior. 223 During the coup, Akaev
deployed military units around the newly-renamed capital (Bishkek) to prevent a local iteration;
once the dust settled in Moscow, he officially outlawed the CPK. 224 Later that year he would be
reelected President of the newly-independent republic after running unopposed. 225
The Switzerland of the East?
The collapse of the Soviet Union presented a range of challenges for Central Asia, with
Kyrgyzstan being no exception. While Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan could rely on
their vast hydrocarbon and mineral wealth, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan were less fortunate in that
regard. In Tajikistan, the collapse in state capacity associated with a budget crisis –
approximately 46% of the budget came from Moscow – a lack of exploitable resources, and
structural instability as a result of exclusionary ethno-regionalist politics all contributed to the
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onset of civil war.226 In Kyrgyzstan, the Akaev’s government attempted to head off these issues
by embarking on massive privatization drives – particularly in the agricultural and real estate
sectors - as well as by seeking extensive assistance in the form of foreign aid. 227 Many of the
foreign aid relationships established by the Akaev government between Kyrgyzstan and the
United States, Turkey, and China persist to this day. While a considerable portion of this aid was
based on a romanticized Western notion of Kyrgyzstan as Central Asia’s “island of democracy,”
early-independence Kyrgyzstan still stood in stark contrast to its staunchly authoritarian
neighbors – with a robust free press, political and economic liberalization, and civil and political
liberties unmatched in the region.228
Problems quickly emerged in newly independent Kyrgyzstan despite a promising start to
independence. One area of concern was the outmigration of ethnic Slavs and Germans. By 1993
approximately 100,000 ethnic Slavs had emigrated, accompanied by half of the country’s
population of 100,000 ethnic Germans; this emigration represented a drain of political and
economic resources and expertise which some Kyrgyz elite viewed with concern. 229 By contrast,
the continued dominance of non-Kyrgyz ethnicities across many high-skill and government
sectors served as a rallying point for Kyrgyz nationalism and continued backlash against ethnic
Slavs.230 This is to say nothing of the challenges faced in Osh in the South in terms of ethnic
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tensions; despite the end of hostilities and a 1991 agreement redressing local concerns of
political and cultural representation for Uzbeks, “Osh was a city where ethnic apartheid was
vehemently practiced by both Uzbeks and Kyrgyz.”231 This apartheid developed a distinctly
spatial element as well in the form of political redistricting designed to favor Kyrgyz
neighborhoods for municipal services while excluding Uzbeks. 232 Conditions for southern
Uzbeks had so-deteriorated by the mid-1990s that there were renewed calls for separatism. 233
Small communities of Russians in the south remained insular as well – abstaining from the 1995
elections en-masse.234
Religious challenges also emerged in the early years of independence, particularly with
an influx of Christian and Muslim missionaries. Among the Christians, this included
missionaries from Sun Myung Moon’s Unification Movement as well as Jehovah’s Witnesses,
Pentecostals, and other evangelical Christian groups.235 Among Muslim missionaries, Wahhabis
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were highly active in proselytization as well. The latter efforts were more pronounced in the
Ferghana Valley in the south where audiences tended to be more receptive. 236 Such efforts were
likewise accompanied by a construction boom of mosques and madrasas, often funded by foreign
money.237 Throughout the 1990s, concerns also arose from militant fundamentalist activity in
surrounding countries, including the Taliban in Afghanistan, the Islamic Renaissance Party (IRP)
in Tajikistan, and the IMU. While the latter would violate Kyrgyz territorial sovereignty in the
late 1990s, internally fundamentalism failed to take hold in any capacity which threatened
overall state stability.238 As Ahmed Rashid notes, rather than being an outright political force
Islam provided “a means to break with the communist past rather than a means to a new political
future.”239 Nonetheless, as with other post-Soviet states religious revival unnerved secular
officialdom; by 1996 a series of new laws against foreign religious proselytization were
implemented by the Akaev government – a policy mirrored in Russia in 1997. 240
The greatest challenges to emerge in newly independent Kyrgyzstan, however, involved
the nature of the Kyrgyz state itself. For one, rapid economic and political liberalization proved
more challenging than anticipated by the Akaev regime – who now sought to balance domestic
political and economic concerns with the terms of the half-billion US dollars in outside foreign
aid the country received between 1991 and 1994. 241 These economic concerns correlated with a
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rightward shift in Kyrgyz politics in 1994, involving Akaev shuttering several opposition
newspapers and calling a popular referendum resulting in the redrafting of the constitution –
itself in violation of the constitution.242 This is to say nothing of the corruption which publicly
emerged following Soviet collapse. Akaev was equally culpable despite his complaints – packing
his cabinet with personal friends. Having become isolated from other elected officials, Akaev
attempted to govern through local and oblast-level politicians, banking on the continued power
of patronage across the country. 243 The 1996 referendum on another constitutional redraft – one
which would further broaden Akaev’s power - saw levels of turnout (96.5%) common in
anocracies and autocracies. The election was likely fraudulent. 244
Beyond domestic political concerns, the late 1990s demonstrated the challenges faced by
the Kyrgyz state in dealing with neighbors. In 1999 two crises involving the border between
Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan rocked south Kyrgyzstan. In February of 1999, Uzbekistan’s
government unilaterally closed the border – citing security concerns after a string of bombings
and an assassination attempt on Uzbek president Islam Karimov in Tashkent - blamed on the
IMU.245 Uzbekistan proceeded to re-define the border, annexing Kyrgyz land that had been
leased to Uzbekistan for livestock grazing during the Soviet Union. Uzbek demarcation resulted
in the creation of Kyrgyz exclaves in the region – completely disconnected from Kyrgyz
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territory.246 August of 1999 brought further crisis and incursion along the border, when IMU
guerillas tore through Batken, in the process taking four Japanese geologists and several Kyrgyz
– including a high-ranking military commander – hostage. 247 This incursion by the IMU saw
Uzbek military and police forces pursuing the guerillas into Kyrgyz territory. In the process,
Uzbek government forces entrenched and laid mines – establishing semi-permanent redoubts
which further exacerbated interstate tensions between the two countries. 248 Uzbek forces also
strafed Kyrgyz villages under IMU control, killing Kyrgyz civilians in the process. 249 Four
thousand civilians fled to the surrounding mountains to avoid the fighting. 250
The crisis was resolved in October of Nineteen Ninety-nine. The militants successfully
managed to ransom both the Japanese geologists and the Kyrgyz government officials – at other
times freeing hostages as they retreated. The Kyrgyz government paid $50,000 for four hostages
initially taken by the IMU. Japan paid between two and six million dollars for the return of its
citizens. Remaining IMU fighters were allowed passage to Tajikistan and later Afghanistan,
where they were welcomed with open arms by the Taliban. 251 The following year a group of
mountain climbers including four Americans were taken hostage were kidnapped in Kyrgyzstan
by the IMU, escaping after they pushed their guard off a cliff and were rescued by Kyrgyz
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special forces.252 This was the last major high-profile incident involving the IMU in south
Kyrgyzstan.
The Batken Crisis of 1999 is important in that it demonstrated the challenges faced by
Kyrgyzstan’s government in maintaining internal sovereignty and quickly and competently
addressing crises. Kyrgyzstan’s response to IMU incursions and hostage-taking bordered on
comical in terms of incompetence. Conscript units tasked with handling the situation were in
some cases so poorly equipped that they were required to scrounge their own food – with one
unit reportedly spending a half day hunting and barbequing mountain goats. An additional
$420,000 in cash was reallocated from government coffers and quite literally put in a briefcase to
pay ransom for the remaining hostages. It would later be alleged that in an act of particular
skullduggery, Akaev and his Chief-of-Staff Medet Sadyrkulov utilized the money to bribe a
foreign journalist who was preparing to publish an in-depth analysis of the Akaev family’s
finances, business dealings, and high-level corruption. Akaev calculated that such an expose
might harm his chances at reelection.253
Revolution
Akaev’s corruption and anocratic tendencies led to his ouster in the Tulip Revolution of
2005.254 His anocratic streak had persisted through the 1995 and 2000 elections, as well as in the
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interim. After ceding a piece of disputed territory to China in 2002, opposition leaders led by
Azimbek Beknazarov called for Akaev’s impeachment based on the secrecy of the terms under
which the deal was reached; they played upon traditional tropes of Kyrgyz nationalism, such as
Manas expelling the kitais – Chinese – from premodern Kyrgyzstan. The Akaev government
reacted by attempting to discredit and jail Beknazarov, resulting in protests and his eventual
release.255 The Akaev government also sought to ban another leading opposition politician –
Roza Otunbayeva – from running for parliament on absurd technicalities, namely that she did not
meet residency requirements to run for office based on her years of service as an overseas
diplomat.256 The 2005 parliamentary elections would prove the straw that broke the camel’s back
for the Akaev regime.
The first round of balloting on February 27th saw vocal criticism of ballot-rigging and
other anti-democratic behaviors by international election monitors. 257 In addition to a near-clean
sweep by establishment candidates, including the president’s children, a number of other issues
presented themselves.258 Foreign observers noted disqualification of opposition candidates on
technicalities, harassment of independent media and support of the government by state-run
outlets, and outright vote-buying on both sides. 259
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By February 28th protests had started in Osh province. 260 Several days later a grenade was
thrown onto the balcony of Roza Otunbayeva’s apartment and exploded, resulting in minor
damage and no injuries; the government denied responsibility for the attack. 261 Large protests
which began in Jalal-Abad on March 5th spread to neighboring Osh by the 9th, with major swaths
of south Kyrgyzstan falling out of government control within two weeks of initial protests. 262
During this period, protests also reached Bishkek. By the afternoon of March 24 th, Akaev and his
family fled first to Kazakhstan, and later to Russia. The Kyrgyz Supreme Court nullified the
results of the parliamentary elections the same day. During this period, a potential counterrevolution of northern Akaev supporters emerged, but quickly halted their attempts after former
government officials intervened.263 On April 4th, Akaev resigned from Moscow – never to return
to Kyrgyzstan.264
Kurmanbek Bakiev – a powerful southern politician and key opposition leader during the
revolution – succeeded Askar Akaev. Reform under Bakiev failed to materialize; he would prove
equally if not more corrupt than Akaev. This corruption was accompanied by increasingly erratic
paranoia, curbs on civil liberties, and harassment, imprisonment, and outright murder of
journalists and opposition figures. 265 He also enacted policies which resulted in increased energy
costs, including raising the price of electricity. Bakiev’s behavior even concerned the Russians to
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the point that they began airing ads against him on local TV in Bishkek in the lead up to the
Second Kyrgyz Revolution.266 Protests against Bakiev began in Bishkek on April 3rd of 2010,
five years after Akaev’s official resignation. Protests quickly spread across the country as they
grew in Bishkek, with increasingly violent clashes between protestors and security services. By
April 7th, protestors were being killed by snipers as they attempted to storm the presidential
palace; Bakiev had ordered use of lethal force. 267 Bakiev would flee to his family compound in
Teyit village outside Jalal-Abad on the same day. 268 On April 8th, Bakiev attempted to rally
support in his home province for a counter-revolution, but ultimately failed. By the 16 th he
officially resigned.269
Despite Bakiev’s resignation, unrest continued for several months following the
revolution. The interim government was dysfunctional; it could barely manage itself let alone the
affairs of the state.270 While Bakiev had fled to Belarus – Europe’s last dictatorship – his allies in
Kyrgyzstan sought to sow chaos across the south. On May 13 th Bakiev supporters seized several
municipal buildings across southern provinces under the direction of the President’s brother as
well as his chief of staff.271 Security forces recaptured buildings in Osh and Jalal-Abad the
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following day.272 Opposition politicians played a key role in directing security service efforts;
police and military units were initially reluctant to respond. 273 In Jalal-Abad, security services
were aided by approximately 3,000 armed irregulars fielded by opposition politicians. Over half
of these individuals were associated with the Uzbek-dominated Rodina party – led by Kadyrjan
Batyrov. That evening, Bakiev family compounds were torched – allegedly by Uzbek mobs
under the direction of Batyrov. This angered many southern Kyrgyz and resulted in a flare-up in
ethnic violence on May 19th following several days of protest and the ransacking of the Batyrovfunded Kyrgyz-Uzbek University of People’s Friendship – which would itself be torched during
inter-ethnic violence the following month.274 Batyrov fled the arson charges and his arrest and is
now believed to be living in Dubai. The April revolution and May events had resulted in
renewed ethnic tensions between Kyrgyz and Uzbek and would ultimately serve as a catalyst for
extreme violence across south Kyrgyzstan the following month. 275
Echoes of 1990
By June, south Kyrgyzstan was on edge. Ethnic tensions were at levels unseen since the
events of 1990. The events of May were followed by a series of minor inter-ethnic clashes –
which gradually escalated in scope and scale. On June 9 th a fight outside a chaykhana (teahouse)
in western Osh city drew a large crowd of several hundred. Another alleged incident involved a
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fight which began after a revenge killing “by one ethnic group against a man who had beaten up
a prostitute at a hotel.”276
On the evening of June 10th violence erupted in Osh. That evening, a clash occurred
outside the Al-Bukhari mosque. It drew a large crowd of 1000 – half Kyrgyz, half Uzbek. Shops
were looted and approximately fifty individuals engaged in a brawl. Later that evening, a
gambling dispute between a group of young Uzbek and Kyrgyz men quickly devolved into
another street brawl. Later reports point to this as the trigger event which incited a week of
widespread inter-ethnic violence. The brawl quickly grew into a riot which drew opposing
crowds armed with crude weapons. Security forces were unable to quell the fighting, which had
drawn large groups of young, unemployed men who had been loitering in the area. A false rumor
that a group of Uzbek men had raped and murdered a Kyrgyz woman residing in a nearby
university dormitory drew out more Kyrgyz young men. By the early hours of June 11 th, the
situation was out of control; the official report notes that the violence “metastasized with
alarming speed.”277 By June 12th violence would spread to Jalal-Abad, as well as surrounding
rural areas.278
The ensuing violence remains difficult to capture in brevity. 279 It was extreme, targeted,
and well organized in nature. Mobs of young Kyrgyz men roamed the streets targeting Uzbek
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businesses and neighborhoods – later reinforced by individuals from outlying districts arriving to
avenge attacks or rapes of Kyrgyz by Uzbeks. Witnesses to the incidents describe squad-toplatoon sized elements under the direction of a single individual systematically moving through
Uzbek mahallas (districts or neighborhoods) while being consistently resupplied with food,
water, vodka, flammable liquids, and firearms and ammunition. A significant number of firearms
were looted from security forces, while others were said to be distributed by local, regional, and
national politicians from the region. Mobs also employed pickup trucks and armored personnel
carriers (APCs), the latter of which were seized from security forces. In some cases, APCs were
provided to mobs by security forces; some members of security forces themselves participated in
the looting and razing of mahallas alongside marauders (See Appendix F).280 During this period,
Uzbeks reacted by barricading and attempting to defend their neighborhoods, sometimes
returning fire against Kyrgyz mobs. In areas outside the city, Uzbeks established ad-hoc
checkpoints along roadways. Uzbeks also engaged in retaliatory violence against Kyrgyz during
the riots, however it appears less coordinated. Over the course of the rioting, both parties – and
sometimes the security services - were guilty of assault, hostage-taking, rape and other sexual
violence, and murder. While some of the looting and violence was likely opportunistic, Kyrgyz
violence against Uzbeks was well coordinated if not previously planned. 281
The response by the interim government proved ineffective if not incompetent. Securityservices were marshalled to defend government buildings rather than intervene and halt violence
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– in stark contrast to the 1990 violence.282 One of the largest and most distressing criticisms of
security services during the violence is that they often surrendered their weapons without
incident to rioters. Rioters obtained hundreds of government light arms – pistols, Kalashnikov
rifles, machine guns, sniper rifles, and even mortars – as well as thousands of rounds of
ammunition from police and military units. More concerning, security forces themselves
participated in violence, rape, and looting – based on opportunism and/or shared sentiment. Even
following the end of rioting, some members of the security services perpetrated kidnapping for
ransom and sexual extortion. As per the official report, government officials and institutions bore
significant responsibility for the violence based on lack of coordination, incompetence, and a
lack of leadership.283 Official explanations for violence tended to blame outside forces, ranging
from Bakiev to the Taliban and the IMU. Many government officials themselves blamed Uzbeks
– accusing them of planning the uprising. In a further tone-deaf move, on June 27 th, less than a
month after the violence, the government also insisted holding a referendum on the new
constitution based on a need to cultivate legitimacy. The referendum saw high turnout nationally
according to the government, yet Osh had the lowest levels of participation anywhere in the
country. International election monitors noted minor concerns but otherwise allowed the
referendum to proceed unhindered. 284
Violence ended between June 14th and June 16th. The violence and the aftermath saw
significant numbers of IDPs and refugees, with up to 120,000 Uzbek women, children, and
elderly fleeing the fighting by crossing the border into neighboring Uzbekistan. 80,000 returned

282

Kyrgyzstan Inquiry Comission, “KIC Report.”

283

Kyrgyzstan Inquiry Comission; International Crisis Group, “Pogroms.”

284

International Crisis Group, “Pogroms.”

83

in the immediate aftermath of the violence.285 Approximately 2,700 buildings were destroyed,
resulting in 75,000 displaced people. Estimated death tolls ranged from the official 839 to an
excess of 2000.286 Among 426 officially registered corpses, approximately 90% were identified;
105 of the identified were Kyrgyz while 276 were Uzbek. Of approximately 2,000 officially
counted injuries, almost half suffered from gunshot wounds. The official international inquiry
published in May of 2011 estimated total financial damage at approximately $81,000,000 USD.
Finally, post-violence assessments do not provide an adequate assessment of the sexual and
gender-based violence which occurred during and after the rioting. 287 Under-reporting is judged
as the result of social stigmas, weak reporting mechanisms, and continued discrimination against
women and the Uzbek community. 288
In the days and weeks following the conflict, the Kyrgyz government engaged in largescale sweep operations to apprehend those responsible for the violence; they would
disproportionately target Uzbeks. These operations saw rampant police abuse, extortion, torture,
and confessions obtained under duress. By December, authorities had initiated over 5,000
investigations related to the June 2010 violence. These investigations were distributed between
Osh city (2,990), Osh oblast (1,227), and Jalal-Abad (900). Over 3,500 of these investigations
were dropped based on the lack of an identifiable suspect. Of the criminal charges to result from
these investigations, 79% of those charged were Uzbek, 18% were Kyrgyz, and 2% were of other
ethnicities. Of the 27 individuals charged with murder, 24 were identified as Uzbek and 2 were
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identified as Kyrgyz.289 Several months following the events, 71 individuals had been officially
charged with murder; of this total 83% were Uzbek and 10% were Kyrgyz. Most cases were
investigated by Kyrgyz-dominated police forces, and all cases were tried in front of Kyrgyz
judges.290 Incidentally, this was cited by some officials as a cause of inter-ethnic animus in the
first place. One official noted that the entire legal system – the police, the courts, and the
prosecutors – was dominated by and served the interests of ethnic Kyrgyz; he further postulated
that it was little wonder Uzbeks harbored skepticism of the government and furthermore selfarmed in order to defend themselves.291
The 2010 ethnic violence which terrorized south Kyrgyzstan deepened existing divisions
between Kyrgyz and Uzbeks, and further diminished government legitimacy in the south.
Months on from the event, further political fallout would emerge after the government attempted
and failed to remove the Mayor of Osh –Kyrgyz nationalist politician Melis Myrzakmatov – due
to internal feuding among government officials, some of whom supported Myrzakmatov. 292
Myrzakmatov posed a consistent challenge to central authority in the region, with some outside
observers fearing that his hardline-nationalist rhetoric may reignite interethnic violence. 293 He
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was finally removed from office in 2013, and lost his reelection bid to a pro-government
candidate.294
Over a year after the 2010 violence, Kyrgyzstan held its first elections under the new
constitution on October 30th, 2011. Interim President Roza Otunbayeva stepped down instead of
seeking election. Interim Prime Minister Almazbek Atambayev won the in the first round of
voting – winning 60% of the total vote in a national election with approximately 57% turnout
and a pronounced north/south split in terms of preferred candidate. Atambayev defeated two
prominent nationalist politicians on a pro-Russia platform which included closing the US airbase
at Manas International Airport outside Bishkek and naming a mountain in Kyrgyzstan after
Vladimir Putin. Russia’s backing of Atambayev likely contributed to his victory in a country
where many voters support Russia and Putin. The election did see voting irregularities, and
several opposition candidates alleged election fraud and vowed protests. Nonetheless,
Atambayev successfully assumed the Presidency and served a six-year term before stepping
down as constitutionally mandated.295
Atambayev was replaced in 2017 by Prime Minister Sooronbay Jeenbekov in what was
termed “the first genuinely competitive presidential election in Central Asia.” 296 Jeenbekov
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unexpectedly won with approximately 55% of the vote across the country compared to the 34%
won by his primary opponent, Omurbek Babanov.297 Despite improvements from the 2011
election, there were still significant allegations of electoral misconduct including the arrest of
Babanov supporters and the jailing of opposition leader Omurbek Tekebayev. Jeenbekov also
vowed to imprison Babanov on corruption charges during a televised debate. Jeenbekov’s party
is further alleged to have engaged in vote buying and instructing civil servants to vote for him.
Other candidates resorted to smear tactics, attacking Babanov’s ethnic heritage and false reports
claiming he was attempting to incite the Uzbeks. 298 In a further twist, after assuming the
presidency Jeenbekov’s administration has opened corruption investigations into members of the
Atambayev administration, including the former President himself. Charges range from standardfare money laundering to fraud in infrastructure, development, and foreign military sales. 299 One
particularly notable incident involved the failure of a brand new Chinese-constructed powerplant
in the middle of January of 2017 – leaving many Bishkek residents without heat or electricity. 300
Two officials implicated in the incident are currently facing twenty-year prison terms. 301 Still,
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these investigations appear to be politically targeted considering alleged corruption within the
new administration including the appointment of former Bakiev officials as well as the
distribution of key political posts through patronage networks. This is to say nothing of the
entrenched corruption within state institutions themselves, and the continued reliance of Kyrgyz
politicians on clan and patronage networks. 302
Over nearly thirty years of independence, the Kyrgyz Republic has developed
significantly as an independent country. It also continues to face significant challenges.
Particularly post-independence, this history has played a key role in shaping the Kyrgyz
Republic as the space it is today. This history also gives context to the place and space of the
Republic and helps elucidate both existing scholarship and firsthand observations on the nature
of the Republic as a political-geographic space. In observing this history, there are several key
takeaways. Foremost is that the Republic occupies the space of what one interviewee termed the
“experimental state.”303 It stands in contrast to its autocratic neighbors in the sense that it is a
democracy, but also mirrors them in terms of anocratic tendencies and political systems
embroiled in corruption and closely tied to kinship and patronage networks. Nonetheless,
Kyrgyzstan has sought to break the status quo by experimenting with periodic restricting of
government and the state constitution since initial independence in 1991. The other critical
takeaway from observing thirty years of Kyrgyzstan’s history is that like many other relatively
young states, it has consistently struggled to cultivate state capacity due to a variety of
geographic, political, social, and economic factors. While things have improved since 1990,

302

Aidar, “Alleged Elite Corruption.”

303

Emil Dzhuraev, Interview with Emil Dzhuraev, interview by Christopher Cowan, In-Person, July 4, 2018.

88

1999, and 2010, there are still areas of the country where the capacity of the state and the
authority of the Bishkek central government is lacking – particularly in the geographically
disconnected south. This struggle to cultivate capacity has been an omnipresent if not defining
theme of post-Soviet politics in Kyrgyzstan and is likely to remain so for the foreseeable future.
Kyrgyzstan as a Space
Beyond an extensive review of the history and politics of the Republic, as scholarship in
Geography it is critical to provide context for Kyrgyzstan as a space. Elements of this
characterization are closely tied to the physical, historical, human, and political geography of the
country. What’s more, defining Kyrgyzstan as a space provides the basis for interrogating the
critical themes of this research - namely the role of transnational processes in shaping space and
notions of state capacity and the “experimental state.” The spaces discussed in this section
should be thought of as both nested and scalar; some exist at local and regional scales whereas
others span multiple regions and even extend to the national scale. 304 These characterizations are
rooted in existing scholarship on the Republic, but more importantly rely upon firsthand
observations recorded during fieldwork.
Central Asia and Post-Soviet
Based on its geographic situation, history, and culture, Kyrgyzstan can foremost be
classified as a uniquely Central Asian space. In the popular imagination these characterizations
of space draw inspiration from the Silk Routes of yore. The local tourism industry has indeed
capitalized on this narrative; promotional materials for the “land of celestial mountains,” tout
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yurts, horse culture, and unspoiled blue-sky vistas of mountains and steppe. While cliché, these
narratives serve as a useful basis for more broadly situating Kyrgyzstan as a Central Asian space
based on its geography, language, culture, history, and politics.
Beyond its situation within Central Asia as a region, geographically Kyrgyzstan exhibits
numerous similarities to its co-regionalists. In terms of physical geography, terrain is defined by
mountains and steppe as well as several Köppen climate zones shared by neighboring countries.
Language also contributes to this ideation of space. Apart from Tajikistan, the Republic shares a
Turkic language with its co-regionalists. It likewise shares similar culinary traditions, which
place a heavy emphasis on meat, bread, and dairy. While the Tajiks and Uzbeks were the first
settled peoples of the region, Kyrgyzstan shares nomadic heritage with Turkmenistan and
Kazakhstan. At one point, there was little distinction between Kazakh and Kyrgyz – both of
whom were simply referred to as “Kyrgyz.”305 When the Soviets drew borders, the steppe
Kyrgyz would become the Kazakhs, whereas the mountain Kyrgyz would remain Kyrgyz.
The political-geographic space of the Kyrgyz Republic also exhibits distinct hallmarks of
Central Asian-ness. As noted previously, anocratic tendencies contribute to this ideation of
space, as do efforts to cultivate new nationalism following the collapse of the Soviet Union. Like
neighboring Tajikistan, are strong north/south regional cleavages. 306 The phenomenon of
political organization along ethno-regional lines is shared between the two countries; these
identities play a key role in the formation of political-geographic space and have also served as a
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historical catalyst for violence. 307 Like neighbors in the region, politics are likewise closely tied
to clan loyalties, kinship ties, and patronage networks. 308 A concept familiar to scholars of
Southwest Asia and North Africa, this closely resembles wasta, or “who you know.”309 This
often translates into corruption. Thus, much like the other political-geographic spaces of Central
Asia, Kyrgyzstan is a space shaped by a political system closely linked to organized crime and
likewise defined by significant levels of corruption and abuse of public resources. 310 As noted, in
Kyrgyzstan organized crime is merely “politics by other means.” 311Corruption is a way to make
a living – particularly as an under-compensated civil servant (See Appendix G).
Like other spaces in Central Asia there is also an element of absurdity to the Republic.
Popular conceptions of this absurdity trend toward the simplistic; when many people imagine the
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former Soviet Union – especially Central Asia - they picture a corrupt, dysfunctional backwater
attempting to reconcile the Soviet past with the post-Soviet present. 312 While there is plenty
worth satirizing, this discussion is not intended to explore the geopolitics of satire as they pertain
to Kyrgyzstan as a Central Asian space.313 Rather, it is intended to discuss the unique
observations of daily oddities and absurdities in the Republic that endear it to travelers and
present similar examples across the region – from slightly-off copies of global brands to creative
blends of tradition and modernity - such as sheep secured to the roof-racks of Ladas at livestock
markets or solar panels affixed to yurts for power to charge cell phones (See Appendix H) .
Nested within this Central Asian space is a distinct aspect of post-Soviet – an aspect of
space which has played a key role in the development of the Kyrgyz Republic. This manifests
most-observably on the urban landscape – as noted. In terms of how the Soviet past shaped the
current political geography of the Republic, bureaucratic institutions and government as well as
the military retain many aspects of this Soviet past – notably corruption and inefficiency.
There is also a degree of nostalgia for the Soviet Union; one interviewee noted the belief held by
some that “things just worked back then.” 314 This sentiment was catalogued in a national survey
in 2014 by Central Asia Barometer, which demonstrated this sentiment among a plurality of
those surveyed (See Appendix I). While more-rural oblasts such as Naryn, Talas, and Batken
demonstrated less “nostalgia,” oblasts with larger and more urbanized populations displayed the
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opposite trend. Age and gender breakdowns also prove insightful on the distribution of this
sentiment nearly thirty years after the collapse of the USSR.315
Transition, Transit, and Exchange
A further dimension to the Republic as a space is the notion that Kyrgyzstan is a space of
transition, transit and exchange. The notion of transition is closely tied to the post-Soviet space
of the republic; in thirty years Kyrgyzstan has become independent, experienced two revolutions,
and refigured its government several times. The economy likewise remains transitional,
dominated by agriculture, mineral extraction, and remittances from Kyrgyz guest workers
abroad. In the words of one interviewee, the republic remains an “experimental state.” 316
Beyond being a space of transition, Kyrgyzstan is also a space of transit and exchange.
This ideation of space dates at least to the history of the Silk Routes. However, it is also closely
tied to the nomadic past of the Kyrgyz people – who only became sedentary following the
imposition of Russian rule. Transit and exchange in the Republic reemerged in force following
Soviet collapse, and as of late Kyrgyzstan has even emerged as a key trade corridor in Eurasia
under the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative. 317
That which is transiting and/or being exchanged across this space runs the gamut. While
this thesis is focused on illicit traffic in narcotics, licit goods such as agricultural products are
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just as likely to be “smuggled,” as well. Other examples of transit and exchange involve the
movement of people and capital; the former is largely tied to labor migration of Kyrgyz to
surrounding states as migrant workers. The latter involves the remittances which these migrants
send home, as well as less-licit flows of capital. Illicit capital flows come in two categories. The
first are outflows of state funds pilfered by government elites. Post-independence administrations
are notorious for this alleged behavior, however only the Bakiev administration has been subject
to international scrutiny. Regarding the latter category of capital flows, transit of capital typically
involves inflows of foreign capital or transit of local capital destined to be laundered. Some
locally based banks such as Asia Universal Bank are alleged to have been established expressly
for this purpose.
Most importantly, it is critical to recognize Kyrgyzstan as a space of transit and exchange
in terms of ideas. Kyrgyzstan is for better or worse the only democracy in the region – even with
its flaws, caveats, and anocratic regressions. Democracy has nonetheless persisted despite such
challenges – facilitated by street protests, printing presses, and ballot boxes. A comparatively
free press and broad array of civil society institutions ensure a discourse which is robust and
open compared to neighboring states.
Contested Space
Perhaps the most important space of the Republic is that of contested space. Rather than
generalize the entire Republic as a contested space, however, it is more useful to view
Kyrgyzstan as a series of nested spaces of contest spanning the local, regional, and nation-state
levels. These nested spaces are punctuated by the regional divides between north and south, as
well as ethnic tensions and debates over nationalism and national identity. Above the nation-state
level, Kyrgyzstan is also geopolitically contested space.
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At the local level the urban landscape presents an observable indicator of contested space
– transitioning rapidly from the Soviet past to the post-Soviet present in terms of architecture and
banal attempts at nationalism. Public spaces are especially representative; Manas and a large
Kyrgyz flag sit proudly in front of the National Museum while Lenin has merely been moved
behind it (See Appendix J). In other areas, squat khrushyovka apartments and corrugated iron
convenience stores lay slumped alongside vapid, flashy new high-rise developments and local
knockoffs of American fast food chains. In the eastern city of Karakol, development is far-less
gaudy; the largest buildings to dominate the urban landscape are no more than a few stories.
Single-family compounds and Russian-style homes comprise a bulk of the residential areas –
interspersed with establishments catering to backpackers as well as several mosques and an
Orthodox church.
The urban character of Osh – a city historically Uzbek in nature – is different entirely
than that of Bishkek. Low-slung compounds of the Uzbek mahallas are occasionally interrupted
by taller structures including mosques, universities, or apartment buildings. To a traveler the city
feels more pious in nature than Bishkek as well, with morning and evening calls to prayer
audible across the city rather than in isolated neighborhoods of Bishkek. There are other
indicators of contested space in Osh as well. Most notably, a large Kyrgyz flag flies from a pole
atop Sulieman-Too – perhaps intended as a reminder that while the city may historically be the
site of an Uzbek plurality, it nonetheless is under the control of ethnic Kyrgyz.
This local example of banal nationalism in south Kyrgyzstan intimates the broader nature
of contested space at a regional and national scale within the Republic. In practice, this contest is
observable in the election returns of post-independence politics as well as broader discussions of
nationalism and identity. Regarding the former, regional divides between north and south
95

Kyrgyzstan have historically played a significant role in the political geography of the republic,
with power distributed through regional patronage networks headed by powerful local clans in
the north and the South. Under the Soviets, southern Kyrgyz retained leadership of the republic;
following Soviet collapse power shifted to a northern-based block. In subsequent elections, the
presidency has been passed between regional blocs. Bakiev was from the south, whereas
Atambayev and Jeenbekov are from the north. As noted, the election of Jeenbekov was the first
in the history of Kyrgyzstan since initial independence to see broad-based support for the
president across the country – winning an unexpected victory. 318
Historically, these north-south cleavages have been pronounced in the aftermath of
revolution and political violence, as was the case in 2005 and 2010; following the Osh events of
2010 it took two years for the central government in Bishkek to bring restive Kyrgyz nationalists
in the south to heel; the government still experiences issues with perceptions of involvement and
legitimacy in the south. Granted, it has done itself few favors in this regard based on public
pronouncements and policy directives, which can be viewed as insensitive to southern residents
based on their targeted contempt for religious and cultural practices. One such incident involved
then-President Atambayev remarking something to the effect of “women in mini-skirts don’t
blow themselves up,” when being publicly questioned about a government-sponsored billboard
campaign against niqab and other conservative veiling practices. 319 Absurdities aside, more
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concerning are recent efforts to ban languages other than Kyrgyz or Russian for religious
services. Harkening to the language laws of the 1990s, the new law predominately targets
Uzbeks in the south – the preferred scapegoat of ardent Kyrgyz nationalists.
Even the nationalists are subject to struggle, however. Manas – the preferred Kyrgyz
national symbol – has alternatively been appropriated by the Kyrgyz, Chinese, and Russians over
the past twenty years leading one to question his veracity as a national symbol. In the latter case,
Kyrgyzstan willingly parted with their imposing national warrior; Atambayev claimed that
Manas was in fact an ethnic Russian during his state visit to Moscow. 320 Undeterred, Manaschys
have recently advocate the renaming of Bishkek to Manas. 321
It is also worth noting that the “north-south divide,” and relations between the Bishkek
and the southern “periphery,” are complex, nuanced, and multifaceted in terms of how they
contribute to the notion of the Republic as a contested space. As Bond and Koch argue, the
broader pattern of “north-south,” relations and cycles of inter-ethnic violence are in-fact the
byproduct of a complex set of highly localized circumstances and experiences. 322 These range
from disparities in economic prosperity, representation, and access to services to the experiences
of individual communities, such as discrimination by the state. While inter-ethnic strife between
Kyrgyz and Uzbeks plays a key role in the perception of a “north-south,” divide, this notion is
reinforced by the inherent regionalism present within the clan and patronage structures which
dominate the political-geographic landscape of Kyrgyzstan. This regional divide has become
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more pronounced since independence – particularly with the formation of regionally-aligned
blocs of clans from the north or south.323
Finally, as a contested space the republic is subject to geopolitical contest which
manifests in everything from basing agreements and development aid to foreign funded mosques
and universities. To be sure, these projects are more interested in furthering geopolitical interests
than merely currying good favor or assisting Kyrgyzstan; the European Union, United States,
China, Russia, Turkey, and the Gulf States all pursue their own interests. As with so much of the
former Soviet near-abroad, Russian motivations in Kyrgyzstan are tied to maintaining a friendly
buffer in the region as a hedge against other geopolitical actors; the US air base at Manas
International Airport (closed in 2014) was long a point of contention for the Russians.
Kyrgyzstan likewise provides Russia with a valuable source of migrant labor. The Chinese share
similar concerns but are also interested in using the Republic as a corridor to link western China
to the broader trade networks spanning China, Eurasia, and Europe envisioned under the Belt and
Road Initiative. Turkish goals in Kyrgyzstan are less clear, however Kyrgyzstan serves as a
valuable locale for Turkish investment and business activity and also shares similar linguistic
and cultural traditions to Turkey.324 Uzbekistan’s role in the geopolitics of the region should not
be understated either, given its status as the most populous and developed country of Central
Asia. Under the tenure of Islam Karimov, Uzbekistan consistently sought to influence events in
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the region through diplomacy and through force – likewise serving as a conduit through which
the United States and other superpowers exert military influence in Central Asia and
Afghanistan.325 As noted, in the context of Kyrgyzstan this involved a militarized border,
acceptance of ethnically Uzbek refugees fleeing ethnic violence, and military incursions into
Batken Oblast.326 Finally, as the most open country in the region, the Kyrgyz Republic has
understandably also attracted the US and EU – who engage in efforts to bolster or promote
democracy, good governance, civil society, education, religious tolerance, women’s
empowerment, and public health as well as general economic development. These efforts are
accompanied by attempts to help build the security capacity of the Republic through border
controls, policing, and counterterrorism.
Place, Space, and Capacity
Given the focus of this research it is imperative to discuss place and space in the context
of state capacity in Kyrgyzstan. The post-independence history and nested spaces of the Republic
underscore an array of challenges faced in terms of capacity. These include aspects of
performative capacity, as well as aspects of rent extraction, institutions, the role of crime in the
state, and longstanding challenges to Bishkek’s power in the south.
With regard to performative capacity, state efforts remain gilded. The capital provides a
wellspring of examples which manifest primarily in banal forms. Wandering downtown Bishkek,
these are strikingly omnipresent. Well-manicured parks are punctuated by monuments to national
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figures such as Manas and Chingiz Aitmatov.327 While monuments to WWII remain, there are
newly erected monuments to the conflicts of a new nation, such as the Batken crisis of the mid1990s as well as to the martyrs of the second Kyrgyz revolution in 2010. 328 Efforts to cultivate
nationalism in the Republic can and have backfired repeatedly, however.
Some efforts of state institutions and elites to emphasize the performative aspects of
nation serve as a direct threat to state capacity. For example, recent efforts to revoke the official
status of Russian as a language in Kyrgyzstan have resulted in fears of renewed outmigration by
ethnic Slavs, as well as long-term difficulties for Kyrgyz seeking work in Russia. These serve as
key challenges to state capacity in the sense they reduce the ability of the Kyrgyz state to extract
rents by harming economic productivity with the emigration of high-skill ethnic Slavs. Likewise,
these efforts may jeopardize a critical source of GDP – remittances from migrant workers in
Russia – by worsening diplomatic relations with Moscow and reducing the number of workers
who can work in Russia due to their fluency in Russian. 329
This is to say nothing of the fact that language laws have – in the past – served a key
grievance of minority groups. Left unaddressed, these grievances have contributed to outbreaks
of political violence. In this sense, the performative aspects associated with mandating a national
language can be viewed as undermining state capacity by contributing to the preconditions by
which internal state sovereignty is challenged. A further spatial aspect of language laws is the
space from which they originate as well as the space they shape. In Kyrgyzstan these laws are
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both an input and byproduct of internally contested space. Finally, these laws demonstrate a
central political power which disregards the concerns of those in the minority – mainly
communities of ethnic Uzbeks in the south. The marginalization of such communities is only
likely to further impede the ability of the central government to exert control over the multiethnic south.330
It is also worth noting that state efforts at public performative capacity through
monuments, for example, are closely tied to the nature of Kyrgyzstan as a post-Soviet and
Central Asian space. Efforts by the state to engage in this aspect of capacity can be construed as
an important aspect of building a new nation-state in the aftermath of Soviet collapse. In the
different states of the region, this takes different forms. Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan both rely on
national figures – Timur and Manas, respectively – as symbols through which the national ideal
is represented. In Kazakhstan, this project involved the construction of an entirely new capital
itself. Tajikistan and Turkmenistan are arguably the only two countries of the region where these
projects have failed to materialize in any significant regard due to ethno-regional cleavages in the
former and efforts of the leaders of the latter to establish personality cults. 331 As a whole, these
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efforts by the state to publicly demonstrate capacity and demarcate space and nation are an
important consideration when discussing state capacity in Central Asia.
These efforts at performative capacity are by no means unique to post-Soviet Central
Asia, however they do face a challenge in the region in the form of existing Soviet monuments
and nostalgia. In this sense, elements of contested space are nested within the spaces of postSoviet Central Asia. In Kyrgyzstan, this challenge is embodied by remnants of public space
demarcated by Lenin and a plurality of citizens professing Soviet nostalgia. 332 While there are
other considerations to retaining these statues, they still seemingly challenge state efforts to
perform nationalism through monument – sometimes to the effect of sardonic satire. 333
The final aspect of space and capacity which requires discussion is the role of crime in
the state and the integrity of institutions. Both are closely tied to the nested spaces of the Kyrgyz
Republic. Likewise, both are important to understanding capacity or lack thereof in the Republic.
While a more robust geography of corruption is warranted, in short this thesis operates under the
framework that penetration of the state by criminal actors and institutional corruption diminish
state capacity due to rents lost through corruption, a breakdown of ideational capacity, and the
reinforcement of exclusive and extractive political institutions.334 In Kyrgyzstan these are
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likewise closely tied to the politics of patronage – a system which itself exhibits important spatial
dynamics.335
Regarding how these aspects of capacity are influenced by the space of Kyrgyzstan, there
are two important considerations tied the spaces of transition, transit, and exchange and
geopolitical contest within the republic. Foremost, as a space of transition, transit, and exchange
Kyrgyzstan provides a space wherein corruption can flourish because the spatial infrastructure
for corruption exists. While large banks have consistently proved willing to launder the proceeds
from crime, in Kyrgyzstan these operations have been closely linked to the government and
elected officials.336 This seemingly serves as a tailor-made case of Glassman and Tilly’s
conceptualizations of regressive capacity – i.e. the state as an institution designed to benefit
global hyper-capitalism and/or wealthy elites respectively. 337 In the case of Kyrgyzstan,
regressive capacity with regards to graft and corruption more closely mirrors Tilly’s ideation of
regressive capacity and state-making as organized crime. 338
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Beyond the transit of capital from state coffers, spaces of transition and geopolitical
contest also contribute to corruption and regressive capacity in the Republic. This is a byproduct
of several spatial circumstances in Kyrgyzstan which have allowed corruption to persist. Despite
political transition, Kyrgyzstan has failed to transition from a reliance on subsidies. Prior to
1991, these were provided by Moscow. After the Soviet collapse, Western foreign donors were
more than happy to subsidize the only democracy in the region. 339 Continued support has
resulted in an estimated $13 billion US in aid and loans to Kyrgyzstan since independence. For
reference, Kyrgyz GDP in 2015 was $6.5 billion; official estimates placed annual losses from
official corruption at $700 million.340 Outside backers remain determined to support Kyrgyzstan
through loans, aid, and grants, however. There is little doubt that the contested geopolitical space
of the Republic serves as a key motivator in this willingness on the part of outside backers to
continue to subsidize the Kyrgyz government. In terms of relation to state capacity, foreign
assistance without accountability has allowed for continued official corruption and aid fraud in
the development sector, reducing the effectiveness of aid and contributing to the broader capacity
issues of ideational and implementational capacity. 341
The typologies of space embodied by the Kyrgyz Republic underscore the challenges
faced by the republic in cultivating capacity. Each of the nested spaces of the republic presents
unique challenges – particularly in state efforts to cultivate performative, fiscal, ideational, and
implementational capacity. Furthermore, a space where corruption persists contributes to the
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notion of the state as a victim of regressive capacity. In some cases, state efforts to remedy these
issues have further exacerbated them. In short, state capacity in the Republic is inexorably linked
to the nested spaces of the republic. It is an input upon how these spaces are shaped and exist and
is likewise a product of the spaces which it shapes.
Conclusion: Chapter III
This section provided a brief overview of Central Asia as well as a detailed summary of
the Kyrgyz Republic as a place and space. In doing so, it ties the history, politics, and space of
the Republic to critical issues of capacity – with a general theme of a struggle to cultivate
capacity over nearly thirty years of independence. Importantly, it also introduced the notion of
the republic as an “experimental state,” that is a state which is periodically refiguring its
institutions and politics. In discussing the findings of field interviews, Chapter V will explore
these concepts further in the broader context of state and societal responses to narcotics
trafficking in the republic and the ramifications for state capacity. The next Chapter will
concisely detail field research, data collection, and treatment before discussing results in the
following section.
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Chapter IV: Research Design and Methodology
This section will detail the design and methodology employed during research specifically the collection and analysis of primary source narratives and data. This research relies
on two chief sources of information. Foremost, it relies on field interviews - which provided key
insight into the political and criminal landscape of the Kyrgyz Republic. Beyond interviews and
field observations, this research utilizes publicly accessible data to visually and cartographically
represent some of these trends - specifically with regards to political sentiment and counternarcotics efforts.
Rationale: Field Interviews
The primary source information around which this thesis is structured are a series of field
interviews conducted in the Kyrgyz Republic during the summer of 2018. The decision to pursue
field interviews was guided by several considerations. Owing to a firm-footing in human
geography dating to the inception of this research project, it was deemed imperative that this
research incorporate a fieldwork component. This component was designed to obtain primarysource data in the form of narratives. It furthermore was designed to provide the firsthand
observations necessary for contextualizing the Kyrgyz Republic as a space. Literature review - as
demonstrated in Chapter II - strongly supports the use of field interviews for conducting this
manner of research - namely the work of Alexander Kupatadze and Kyle Evered. 342 Kupatadze’s
work especially provided a model which this research sought to emulate.

342

Kyle T. Evered, “TRADITIONAL ECOLOGIES OF THE OPIUM POPPY AND ORAL HISTORY IN RURAL
TURKEY*,” Geographical Review 101, no. 2 (April 2011): 164–82, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.19310846.2011.00085.x; Kyle T. Evered, “‘POPPIES ARE DEMOCRACY!’ A CRITICAL GEOPOLITICS OF OPIUM
ERADICATION AND REINTRODUCTION IN TURKEY*,” Geographical Review 101, no. 3 (July 2011): 299–
315, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1931-0846.2011.00098.x; Alexander Kupatadze, “Kyrgyzstan – A Virtual NarcoState?,” International Journal of Drug Policy 25, no. 6 (November 2014): 1178–85,
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.drugpo.2014.01.012.

106

Most importantly, the rationale for conducting field interviews was firmly rooted in prior
fieldwork conducted by the Department of Geosciences at the University of Arkansas specifically the work of thesis director Ted Holland. 343 Specifically, Holland’s work in Kalmykia
in the North Caucasus provided a framework for designing interviews - including consent
agreements, prompts, and interview structure. 344 Finally, the decision to pursue fieldwork in
Kyrgyzstan was strongly influenced and encouraged by geographers Alex Diener and Matt
Derrick, both of whom have previously conducted fieldwork in the Republic and provided input
during the early stages of planning - and fieldwork itself in Derrick’s case. 345
Research Design and Overview of Fieldwork
Research was designed around fieldwork featuring semi-structured interviews utilizing
eleven prompts, as well as follow-up questions deemed relevant during the course of the
interview, approved by the Institutional Review Board at the University of Arkansas (See
Appendix K). Fieldwork was conducted in the Kyrgyz Republic between late June and early
August of 2018 under affiliation with the Central Asian Studies Institute at the American
University of Central Asia, during which time fifteen interviews were conducted. Interviews
were conducted in English and Russian, with an interpreter facilitating in the case of the latter.
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Interviewees came from a variety of backgrounds including international organizations, local
NGOs, academia, and the national government. Interview questions are as follows:
1. How would you describe yourself? Do you identify with a particular religion or
ethnic group?
2. What do you think influences responses to narcotics trafficking? Do you think
these influences impact the effectiveness of these responses? How?
3. Do you see religion as a factor influencing responses to narcotics trafficking?
Likewise, do you see ethnic affiliation or personal kinship ties playing a role?
4. Specifically regarding societal responses to narcotics trafficking, do you believe
religion plays a major role? If so, how and why?
5. Could you provide the following information: age, educational level, the nature of
your employment, and general outlook?
6. Generally speaking, how do you perceive the issue of narcotics trafficking in the
Kyrgyz Republic?
7. Are you familiar with some of the government and societal responses to narcotics
trafficking in the Kyrgyz Republic?
8. What are some of the government and societal responses you've personally
observed? Are you familiar with other responses?
9. Do you think political issues in surrounding countries have influenced narcotics
trafficking? To what degree?
10. Do you think the transition away from the Soviet Union to an independent
country has affected narcotics trafficking and responses to trafficking?
How/Why?
11. Do you think societal changes which accompanied the transition from the Soviet
Union to an independent country, such as the revival of Islam, have impacted
responses to narcotics trafficking, or trafficking itself? How/why?
Regarding interview protocols and procedures, each interviewee was asked to sign a
consent form prior to the beginning of the interview owing to the sensitive nature of the topic of
research. They were also asked how they would like to be identified in any research products
which resulted from fieldwork - i.e. conference papers, planned articles, and this thesis. Several
interviews went unrecorded at the explicit request of the interviewee, however most interviewees
consented to having the audio from their interview recorded. All interviewees consented to notes
being taken during interviews.
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Following each interview, the interviewee was assigned a UID number by which the
interview and subsequent summary report are identified. Reports were drafted following each
interview, and utilize notes, audio, and transcripts to summarize key information provided by
each interviewee.
The metadata related to field interviews is relatively straightforward. During the
fieldwork period, fifteen interviews were conducted with representatives from government,
diplomatic missions, international governmental organizations, non-governmental organizations,
and academia. Interviews themselves were conducted between June 28th and July 30th occurring at regular intervals between one and five days apart depending on scheduling
availability and travel logistics. Of the fifteen interviews conducted, eleven were conducted in
English and four were conducted in Russian. Of the interviews conducted in Russian, one was
conducted with an interpreter - Mrs. Ainura Sulaimanova - present. The three additional
interviews conducted in Russian were conducted independently and recorded. Sulaimanova
produced transcripts of these interviews based on the recordings. Regarding geographic
distribution, eleven of the fifteen interviews were conducted in Kyrgyzstan’s capital, Bishkek.
These interviews were conducted in English - with one exception. Three interviews - all in
Russian - were conducted outside of Bishkek, all with locally based NGOs. One of these was
conducted in Karakol in the eastern part of the country, while the other two were conducted in
Osh in the south. Of the individuals interviewed, five work for IGOs. Another five respondents
direct NGOs; four of these are locally based whereas one is the local office of an international
NGO. Of the remaining respondents, two work for a diplomatic mission, two are professional
academics, and one works for the national government.
At least a dozen interview requests went unanswered, were delayed, or were outright
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refused - including requests submitted to the Ministry of Interior Affairs and the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs. The latter requests were bureaucratically ping-ponged from initial submission to
the conclusion of fieldwork. Despite setbacks, interviews provided valuable insight into the topic
at hand, as well as some quantitative data pertaining to drug trafficking, governance statistics,
and public attitudes towards government. This included providing direction to publicly available
data through Kyrgyzstan’s National Statistics Committee (stat.kg), as well as a catalogue of
stamps utilized by heroin producers and traffickers to mark their product – aggregated at a
country scale.346 Fieldwork also yielded a series of firsthand observations - complete with
photographic documentation - related to space, crime, trafficking, and state capacity; these will
be further discussed in Chapter IV In short, these observations included drug-related graffiti as
well as a number of crypto-currency exchange facilities, luxury vehicles, and high-end real-estate
developments. While not explicitly tied to narcotics trafficking, several interviewees pointed to
these as evidence of broader issues of public confidence in government, corruption, and money
laundering. Critically, fieldwork provided the context for defining Kyrgyzstan as a place and
space. This is crucial given this research originates in Geography and assumes that narcotics
trafficking and subsequent responses are spatial processes.
Rationale: Cartographic Representation
This research is rooted in Geography. As such, it seeks to demonstrate the spatial and
temporal aspect of trends and data encountered during research. These trends innately tied to the
political geography of Kyrgyzstan. The representations in this thesis thus rely on cartographic
training received over the past year in order to visually represent areal data in several
346
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capacities.347 They primarily seek to represent single-variable areal data through use of
choroplethy. In this case, choroplethy was selected to demonstrate spatial patterns based on
intensity of color – with darker colors indicating higher rates of seizures.
Overview of Data Collection and Review of Data Collected
In addition to field interviews, this research makes use of publicly available data provided
through several organizations in order to cartographically represent key aspects of public
attitudes, state capacity, governance, and narcotics trafficking. The three primary sources
through which data was obtained were the UNODC, the National Statistics Committee of the
Kyrgyz Republic (stat.kg), and the Central Asia Barometer. Stat.kg and the UNODC both
provided seizure statistics for Central Asia up until 2015 and 2016, respectively. As previously
noted, this data is used as an approximation based on longstanding issues regarding the validity
of state-reported seizure statistics. From both sources, research sought to collect drug seizure
totals measured in kilograms for as many years possible. During the fall of 2018 this data was
collected for Central Asia and Transcaucasia from 2005-2015 - the years for which most
countries in the region possess reliable data. Data for additional years - from the mid-1990s and
2016 was collected during the spring of 2019. For this survey period, the twenty years between
1996 and 2016 provide the most complete dataset for the region. For Kyrgyzstan specifically, in
addition to country-scale UNODC data stat.kg provided seizure statistics dating from dating
from 2010 until 2014. Both collection efforts specifically targeted heroin and raw and/or
processed opium. These efforts did not assess reported seizures of other opiates or opiate-related
precursors such as illicit morphine, prescription opiates, poppy plants, poppy straw, or precursor
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chemicals. They likewise did not assess seizures of NPS, cannabis, or cocaine - considering that
the focus of this research is trafficking of opiates.
While stat.kg provides some measures of governance, upon initial assessment they
proved unclear in terms of what indicators were being assessed, and furthermore how they were
being assessed. They were equally vague in terms of methodology. As such, governance
statistics provided by stat.kg were eschewed in favor of several large-n surveys conducted across
Kyrgyzstan in 2013, 2014, and 2015 by the Central Asia Barometer. These surveys provide
useful information regarding public views on everything from institutional credibility to
geopolitics, religion, and national direction. Each survey assessed different series of questions,
grouping respondents based on region, age, and gender. The total number of participants (n) was
1000 in the 2013 survey, 800 in the 2014 survey, and 1906 in the 2015 survey.
Data Treatment
The primary data treatment involved with this research was ensuring that quantitative
data was suitable for accurate cartographic representation. These treatments primarily involved
normalizing country-level and oblast-level areal data pertaining to narcotics seizures and crimes.
In the case of seizure data obtained through UNODC and stat.kg, reported seizures in kilograms
were normalized by population - specifically per 100,000 inhabitants. These normalizations were
constructed utilizing historical population data respective to the year represented by each map.
These normalization techniques were utilized based on their common usage in geographical and
statistical analyses of crime. Data from Central Asia Barometer was obtained pre-normalized. In
addition to providing a total n for each survey, survey data indicated the number of respondents
based on oblast, age, and sex/gender. Responses are measured in percentages along these lines.
For the purposes of this research, analysis and representation focused on oblast-level (provincial112

level) responses. Following normalization and data-tidying, it was possible to generate a series of
tables and maps utilizing represent the trends in narcotics seizures and political attitudes in the
Kyrgyz Republic.
Conclusion: Research Design and Methodology
This section detailed the design and methodology employed during research - specifically
the collection and analysis of primary source narratives and data. These data sources both
provide valuable insight into the issue of narcotics trafficking and state capacity in the Kyrgyz
Republic, even if they are admittedly limited in scope. As will be discussed in the next chapter,
fieldwork provided unique insight into issues of trafficking and capacity - both through
interviews and through direct observation. It likewise served as the basis for understanding the
key limitations and assumptions of this research. The open data utilized for this thesis also
provides key insight and context into the trends being studied. Similarly, it allows for the spatial
and temporal situation of these trends through cartographic representation - key considering this
thesis is rooted in political geography and argues the inherently spatial nature of the trends being
studied.
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Chapter V: Findings
This section will discuss the findings of research conducted over the past two years.
Specifically, it will detail key information which was conveyed during field interviews
conducted in the Kyrgyz Republic during the summer of 2018. Likewise, it will detail spatial and
temporal trends observed in publicly reported and available data provided by the United Nations
Office on Drugs and Crime as well as the Kyrgyz government through their public data portal,
stat.kg. Finally, this section will include a discussion of this information as it relates to one
another as well as the broader issue of state capacity in the Kyrgyz Republic.
Trends in Trafficking
Since obtaining independence in the early 1990s, the Central Asian republics have long
struggled to combat narcotics trafficking originating in Afghanistan. The problem has persisted
to the present day but received considerable attention in the early 2000s following the US
invasion of Afghanistan and concerns over terrorist finance tied to the narcotics trade. The
concern among the United States and other Western countries was that insurgents and terrorist
groups operating in the region were drawing significant funding from the narcotics trade – which
may in-turn be utilized to finance international terrorism or at a minimum destabilize the fragile
regimes of the region. In Central Asia, groups such as the Taliban and the IMU represented a
particular concern, considering both groups deep involvement in the heroin trade. 348 These
concerns have continued to guide policy discourse and academic scholarship on the issue,
however interviews and in-depth research elucidate a more nuanced picture of trafficking in the
region, particularly Kyrgyzstan.
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As noted in scholarship and during interviews, for example, organized crime syndicates
play a significantly larger role in trafficking than militant organizations. These include
Kyrgyzstan chapters of the infamous vory v zakone, or “thieves-in-law” – a criminal syndicate
rooted in the Stalin-era gulags with branches throughout the former Soviet Union. At a local
level, groups organized along the basis of ethnicity also play a significant role in trafficking
within Kyrgyzstan – including groups comprised of ethnic Kyrgyz, Uzbeks, Tajiks, Azeris,
Chechens, and Russians. More so than these ethnic mafias, corrupt police and government
officials are believed to be responsible for a lion’s share of trafficking – both internal and
transnational – within the Republic.349 One interviewee also alleged that Chinese organized
crime is making inroads in Kyrgyzstan.350
The other key development to emerge from interviews which challenged existing
scholarship is the nature of what is being trafficked to and through Kyrgyzstan. Historically,
Kyrgyzstan has been subject to high rates of opiate trafficking due to its proximity to
Afghanistan and its situation along a major drug trafficking corridor. Bishkek and Osh represent
major hubs of this activity. Those interviewed noted increasing concern over trafficking in
synthetic narcotics, particularly those produced in or destined for local markets. 351
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Designated “NPS,” by policymakers and authorities, these included locally produced or imported
amphetamines , club drugs, hallucinogens, and synthetic cannabinoids (e.g. “K2”). 352 Field
observations were able to verify some aspects of this burgeoning trade, particularly through
documentation of graffiti tags advertising various types of synthetics for sale via encrypted
messaging services and dark-web marketplaces. Several of these “advertisements,” could be
interpreted as targeting tourists based on the language in which they appeared as well as their
location – in one case in near a tourist hostel (See Appendix L). Of less concern is internal
trafficking of cannabis, which grows wildly throughout the country and is often harvested and
processed into hashish resin by the rural poor.353
The Spatial Nature of Trafficking and Responses
Trafficking and subsequent responses are fundamentally spatial processes. They are
processes that occur in space but also which shape space. Trafficking involves the transfer of a
commodity and capital across space, however this transfer also shapes space and contributes to
the spatial condition of the Kyrgyz Republic as an experimental state. It is an act which elicits
corruption, influences the political landscape, and challenges internal sovereignty and state
capacity. Trafficking in Kyrgyzstan also seeks to maintain a status quo - neither anarchy nor state
competence.
Responses ostensibly seek to counter these challenges by themselves seeking to control
space. Checkpoints, border guards, anti-corruption drives, and a significant presence of
352
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international organizations and foreign actors all represent spatial manifestations of a desire to
combat trafficking. In some ways by attempting to control space these measures counteract their
goal. Checkpoints present further opportunities for police harassment, bribery, and corruption,
from everyday citizens to traffickers moving product.354 Graft in foreign aid tied to these efforts
is a widely recognized but little acknowledged problem. 355 Even then, the sheer amount of aid
available in the Republic precludes any substantive change - if one donor balks there are many
others willing to accommodate. Responses are also concentrated in the north and dismissive of
the south. A recurring complaint among officials familiar with the issue is the unwillingness of
government agencies responsible for policing trafficking to establish headquarters or even larger
branches in south Kyrgyzstan, where the problem is viewed as more acute. 356 This reinforces the
notion among southerners of the south as a periphery – ensuring that enforcement efforts in the
region are more difficult. One interviewee even referred to the south as “semi-autonomous,”
while others noted government ineffectiveness across the south, even alleging that organized
crime syndicates played a larger role in maintaining peace in the south between ethnic groups
than the government.357
This is not to say responses are wholly negative. As later noted, Kyrgyzstan is considered
one of the most progressive countries in the region. This contributes to the conception that it is a
space unique from its neighbors - a more liberal social and political regime. While trafficking has
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rendered the Republic a contested space, subsequent responses contribute to the concept of it
being an experimental state. This comes with benefits and drawbacks, but the harm reduction
measures in the Kyrgyz Republic are arguably better than the alternatives in surrounding
countries.
State and Societal Responses to Narcotics Trafficking
The ultimate thrust of this fieldwork was to determine what influences state and societal
responses to narcotics trafficking in Kyrgyzstan. Prior to fieldwork, there was a strong
assumption that ethnic identity would be presented as a major aspect of trafficking and
responses. Fieldwork and continued research indicate that regionalism and kinship ties outstrip
ethnic identity in terms of importance to trafficking. Still, there remain distinct spatial and
geographic elements to drug trafficking and responses, ranging from Kyrgyzstan’s location to
internal political geography.
Regarding positive responses to trafficking, interviewees were quick to cite the Kyrgyz
Republic as one of the most progressive countries in the region in terms of local harm reduction
and demand reduction.358 Harm reduction programs are primarily designed to diminish harm
associated with narcotics use – but not to reduce narcotics use itself. 359 Examples of harm
reduction involve measures such as distributing prophylactics and clean needles to registered
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drug users as well as providing drug users with legal assistance and personal support. 360 By
contrast, demand reduction is designed to reduce the overall demand and use of narcotics in
society.361 Demand reduction efforts in the Republic encompass everything from establishing
detox centers in prisons to methadone clinics and youth education programs. 362 Both efforts are
heavily supported by international funding and partnerships.
Many interviews proved candid in discussing the challenges to responses to trafficking.
Widespread government corruption was universally cited and was a common theme between all
interviews. This corruption - embodied by patronage, misuse of funds, and preferential treatment
of elites - engenders widespread cynicism and undermines government credibility. Another
common theme in most interviews was the lax attitude that permeates official policy regarding
trafficking, what one interview described as a problem viewed with “little sense of urgency.” 363
Because of low salaries, widespread corruption, and structural instability within law enforcement
and state bureaucracy, many of those interviewed noted the low incentive to police narcotics
flows.364 Structural instability, in this case, is embodied by regular restructuring of institutions
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and high rates of employee turnover - both of which contribute to the notion of an experimental
state.
Officials provided several examples of this. One interviewee expressed frustration with
international efforts to train police and government agencies to utilize specialized equipment or
software, only to have trainees transfer to different agencies or private-sector jobs following the
training. This undermines purpose of such programs. 365 Some international officials were also
critical of the restructuring of the State Service for Drug Control (SSDC). This was viewed as
diminishing the independence and operational effectiveness of the agency. The alleged benefit of
this restructuring is that because SSDC budgets were previously subsidized by foreign aid, they
had grown difficult to independently sustain. Placing the agency under the jurisdiction of the
MoIA ensures that it will continue to receive funding. 366 In a final example, interviewees lauded
a program that utilized foreign aid budgets to subsidize police salaries an effective anathema to
corruption.367 It was in-fact judged as one of the most effective programs against low-level
police corruption implemented in Kyrgyzstan. Despite this, it was eventually shuttered. While
there are legitimate questions over the long-term sustainability of the program, frustration over
counteracting an effective program was apparent.
Effectiveness of individual programs aside, interviewees also noted an attitude of realism
on the part of the Kyrgyz government. This attitude is encompassed by the sentiment that due to
a low-level of violence associated with drug trafficking in Kyrgyzstan, and the fact that it will

365

Anonymous UN Official, Interview - Anonymous UN Official.

366

Anonymous US Official, Interview - Anonymous US Official.

367

Anonymous US Official, Interview - US Official (Personal Capacity); Zelichenko, Interview - Zelichenko.

120

happen regardless, it doesn’t benefit the Kyrgyz government to bear the brunt of a supplyfocused campaign against opiate trafficking. This was alternatively construed as the Kyrgyz
government being unwilling to accept increased levels of violence associated with a campaign to
combat narcotics trafficking on behalf of high-demand countries that engage in comparatively
few demand and harm reduction measures. 368 There is potentially an element of corruption at
play as well; as long as narcotics trafficking remains a security issue in Central Asia, the state
will be eligible for counter-narcotics and security assistance packages associated with the War on
Drugs, which presents an opportunity for further official corruption. In short, it behooves the
corrupt elites of the Kyrgyz state to maintain the status quo.
Finally, policing methods themselves are viewed as an issue. Foremost is the deference to
Soviet methods, which emphasize control of physical space - through checkpoints and border
guards - over good police work. Many experts assert that intelligence-led policing is a far
preferable strategy; there is little will for it.369 The tendency to request aid in the form of
equipment was also cited as a major source of frustration among international agencies, many of
whom argued that good police work does not require high-end 4x4s or new computers. 370
In a repudiation of the historically dominant narrative, several interviewees noted that
there remains little to suggest that narcotics trafficking within the Kyrgyz Republic is directly
tied to terrorist finance.371 While this may have been the case when the IMU was active, most
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“green trafficking,” - trafficking tied to Islamists - is local distribution. 372 One interviewee even
noted - half jokingly - that some more pious Muslim drug dealers stop dealing during Ramadan
and resume after Eid al-Fitr.373 Still, most trafficking and in-country distribution is controlled by
corrupt officials and local mafias based on kinship ties or ethnic affiliation. Despite insufficient
evidence to substantively tie narcotics trafficking in the Republic to militant Islamist groups and
other violent non-state actors, it remains a concern for foreign officials - particularly those
distributing foreign aid. In terms of responses, there is a general sense that the Islamic revival in
the period following the Soviet Union has - in fact - served as a deterrent against local narcotics
use, especially in the south.374
Beyond corruption and lacking political will, there are significant stigmas against drug
use in Kyrgyzstan when it comes to hard drugs including opiates and synthetics - so much so that
several NGOs described facing criticism for working with drug addicts. 375 These stigmas are
extremely strong in the south - described ostensibly as a result of stronger religious influences. 376
One interviewee provided an anecdote detailing how drug users sent to prison in the south were
sometimes “beaten clean,” by other prisoners under the guise of religion. 377 Beyond public
scrutiny, other interviewees noted that NGOs and Civil Society Organizations have broadly
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faced increased government scrutiny in the region. Some interviewees whose organizations work
on drug issues or issues surrounding corruption, human rights, and peacebuilding described
direct personal harassment by government officials.378
Finally, there are two temporal narratives which deserve attention. Foremost is the
evolving landscaping of trafficking and responses in the post-Soviet era. In the immediate
collapse of the Soviet Union, Central Asia was subject to a mass-influx of opiates from war-torn
Afghanistan. Drugs were cheap and widely available - a running joke among police was that a
gram of heroin was as cheap as a bottle of good import beer. 379 Things have improved since the
heyday of narcotics trafficking in the early 1990s, but they have also evolved. While opiates
remain a concern, officials are increasingly worried about the growing trade in NPS produced
locally and trafficked from neighboring China. 380 Fieldwork uncovered direct evidence of this
development (See Appendix L).
The other key temporal narrative is that of that of the post-Soviet. The post-Soviet
dimension of contested space also has a temporal dimension. Some things have gone unchanged
over 27 years, from policing strategies to Soviet monuments. There furthermore remains a
nostalgia for the Soviet Union - things “worked,” back then. Trafficking was by no means
nonexistent, but merely unacknowledged - a problem of bourgeoise Western states. 381 Policing
under the Soviet Union was also viewed by many as more competent; police were viewed as
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better compensated and more professional.382 Likewise, police budgets and structure were not
subject to significant fluctuations resultant from political transitions and upheaval. These
temporal narratives are posited alongside a reality which an equal number of people
acknowledge - that of the shift from Soviet satellite to experimental state which has seen
continuing struggles of governance and development – likely to the benefit of the narcotics trade.
Even with such issues, in the overall context of the region Kyrgyzstan is seen in much
better terms than neighboring countries. Uzbekistan’s crackdown on narcotics trafficking has
been described as draconian, ineffective, and a pretext for repression and targeting of political
opposition.383 A significant portion of Tajikistan’s GDP - estimated at between 30% and 50% - is
tied to the narcotics trade.384 The harm reduction strategy in Kyrgyzstan is seen as comparatively
progressive as well; it is the only country in the region investing in substantive resources for
recovering drug users - ranging from clean zones in prisons to methadone clinics and public
health campaigns. These efforts are widely praised by the international community, who has
invested heavily in them.
Competing Narratives
The breadth of qualitative data gathered during fieldwork is illuminative in its scope,
however it elucidates the competing narratives surrounding this issue. Such narratives are
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doubtless influenced by a range of factors including individual perceptions, personal
experiences, and even geographic location. Furthermore, information from several interviews
directly contradicted information from other interviews, or even information that is publicly
available. One such case involved disagreements officially reported numbers of registered drug
users as compared to estimates by individuals being interviewed. 385 There was likewise a
palpable cynicism in many of the interviews, with some interviewees expressing strong
disagreements with the policies and positions of others. Some local NGOs and foreign officials
noted their skepticism to the efficacy of international efforts coordinated by large IGOs, for
example. The sense among some is that the funding available through these organizations
combined with a lack of accountability contributes to larger issues of graft, corruption, and aid
fraud in the Republic. Another complaint is that some IGOs are all mouth and no trousers – they
contribute nominally to policy discourse but do little in the way of facilitating policy
implementation. One interviewee even alleged that some NGOs are established for the sole
purpose of aid fraud, with little intention to implement projects for which they receive grants.
This was described as “grant eating.”386
Situating competing narratives in a quantitative context proves even more difficult. Many
interviewees urged skepticism of publicly available data and statistics related to narcotics
trafficking in the Kyrgyzstan. This extends to data and statistics provided by the Kyrgyzstan’s
government. Depending on the interviewee, official estimates were either exaggerated or
conservative to the point of being misleading. Several interviewees couched their skepticism of
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seizure data in terms of police corruption - “skimming,” captured product for resale on local
markets, for example. Interviewees likewise noted that official numbers of drug users across the
country are either over-estimated/reported or vice versa; considering that drug users are selfregistered this information is difficult to verify. The UNODC estimated three times as many
active drug users as publicly reported – likely because drug users are self-registered and often
avoid registration to avoid police harassment. 387 Most importantly, there is also a widespread
belief that seizure statistics represent a mere fraction of what actually passes through Kyrgyzstan.
It is with this skepticism in mind that data was examined.
Spatial and Temporal Trends from Data
As noted in Chapter IV, this research relies on three primary sources of data. Foremost
are narcotics seizure statistics provided by the UNODC – which are viewed as an approximation
of what is passing through the Republic. While reporting dates to the early 1990s, reporting of
opium and heroin seizures for the region does not become consistent until 1996. In the twentyyear period for which data was available, Kyrgyzstan seized an average yearly total of 573
kilograms of opium and heroin per year. By contrast, the regional average was 1,495 kilograms
of opium and heroin seized. Of the five republics, Tajikistan’s twenty-year average of 3,399
kilograms seized stands out as the highest – more than 2,000 kilograms more than Turkmenistan
and Uzbekistan which respectively seized an average of 1,381 kilograms and 1,476 kilograms
per year. Interestingly, Kazakhstan reported the second lowest average for the twenty-year period
assessed, seizing an average of 744 kilograms of opium and heroin per year. UNODC reporting
also includes Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia in this region, however reporting for these
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countries – particularly Armenia – remains too sporadic to utilize them as a point of
comparison.388
Examining these seizures temporally also proves valuable. For example, Tajikistan’s total
seizures dropped by almost 2,000 kilograms following the end of the civil war in 1997, only to
increase to over 6,600 kilograms in 2000 and 7,900 kilograms in 2001. By contrast, all other
countries in the region experienced a net drop in seizures between 2000 and 2001 – Kyrgyzstan’s
drop being over 1,000 kilograms. Fluctuations in Kyrgyzstan’s seizure numbers likewise appear
to be correlated with fluctuations in Kyrgyzstan’s internal politics. While there were minor
increases in seizures following the 2005 Tulip Revolution, the years between 2006 and 2010
demonstrate significant fluctuation, dropping by over 500 kilograms between 2009 and 2010 –
when the Bakiev regime shuttered the state drug control service due to their alleged involvement
in trafficking. Numbers have since fluctuated but have not returned to the high rates of seizures
observed in 2000, 2007, and 2009.389
Beyond these numbers, stat.kg reported select data on narcotics trafficking and related
offenses for several years – the most complete being 2011 and 2014. For both years, stat.kg
published data detailing various aspects of drug-related crime in the Republic, including total
numbers of drug-seizures on a regional level, the nature of drug-related crimes, and national
seizure statistics by drug type. Regional-scale data for all categories of drug seizures is displayed
in Appendix M.390 These representations excluded Bishkek and Osh administrative areas –
388
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Kyrgyzstan’s most populous cities – which both saw high rates of seizures. Seizure data was
normalized per 100,000 people as is convention with crime statistics. The result of this analysis
indicates that Chui Oblast – excluding Bishkek – experienced the highest rates of seizures for
both years assessed, while Naryn experienced the lowest rates of seizures. Over this three-year
period, seizure rates dropped in Talas and Issyk-Kul in north Kyrgyzstan but increased in across
south Kyrgyzstan.391
This temporal shift can be interpreted as coinciding with a return to normalcy following
the Second Kyrgyz Revolution. During this period the Bishkek government engaged in efforts to
counter the influence of southern populist politicians – who were viewed to a threat to central
governance. In this sense, the increasing seizures across south Kyrgyzstan could be interpreted as
indicating the increasing capacity of the central government to manage borders and territory in
the south. The idea that government authority and legitimacy has increased in the south is also
supported in some sense by election returns from the 2017 presidential election, when
Atambayev’s hand-appointed successor Jeenbekov carried a majority of voting districts across
the region.392 While there are likely more complex dynamics contributing to the situation as well,
these patterns can be interpreted in one sense as demonstrating increased capacity of the central
government in Kyrgyzstan’s southern periphery. Detracting from this are the views presented in
some interviews that the south remains semi-autonomous, and that the prevailing peace between
ethnic Kyrgyz and Uzbeks is both latent and the result of efforts by criminal syndicates. 393
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Analysis and Discussion: Narratives, Spatial Trends, and State Capacity
One of the key questions associated with this research is determining how spatial trends
in trafficking and narratives presented during fieldwork can be interpreted in order to intimate a
broader picture of state capacity in the Kyrgyz Republic. Likewise, this research is interested
with how capacity is tied to issues of identity in a state where kinship, patronage, and ethnic
affiliation play a key role in politics from the local to national scales.
As demonstrated in Chapter III, the place, space, and history of Kyrgyzstan is intimately
tied to the capacity of the Kyrgyz state. This relationship is pronounced within state and societal
responses to the narcotics trade. In terms of physical geography and state capacity, the
challenging peaks of the Tian Shan Mountains serve to divide the country – resulting in centerperiphery disconnects as well as issues related to state fiscal capacity. 394 They likewise serve as
an impediment to the state exerting itself over the periphery, a key challenge to implementational
capacity in outlying areas.395 In the case of performative capacity, the periphery is alternatively
disregarded by Bishkek or poses a challenge to its authority. 396 With regard to the narcotics
trade, narratives and data indicate that responses to drug trafficking in south Kyrgyzstan suffer
considerably as a result. Osh and Osh Oblast a major transit point for traffic transiting the
Republic, but often reports lower seizures than Bishkek and Chui Oblast. There are other
potential explanations for this, but the fact that state resources are centralized around Bishkek
may play a role.
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Beyond the performative, ideational, and implementational capacity of north-south
relations, the north-south disconnect serves as a reminder that the Kyrgyz government has
historically struggled to maintain a Weberian monopoly on violence in the south. While the 1990
Osh riots were halted by Soviet Interior Ministry troops, the bumbling responses to the Batken
Crisis and the 2010 Osh riots evidence this.397 Worse, the allegations among some of those
interviewed allege that organized crime syndicates serve as a key challenger to state power in the
south and continue to play an important role in the politics of the periphery. 398 This challenge is
not one in the traditional sense of armed clashes between the state and a non-state actor or
insurgent force. Rather, these organizations engage in a number of licit and illicit activities that
serve to coopt the authority of the state in the region. This includes drug trafficking, but also
includes engaging in local and regional politics – such as ensuring peace between ethnic groups
following the 2010 violence. Some groups possess paramilitary wings, and in the past state elites
have used these syndicates and/or paramilitaries to accomplish state-parallel objectives such as
countering the power of other non-state actors viewed as a threat to the state or reclaiming
government buildings following civil unrest. 399 In terms of capacity, the presence of these
powerful local actors ensures continued struggles for the Kyrgyz state in terms of maintaining
the monopoly on control of territory viewed by so many as a critical facet of state capacity. In
this sense, there is a
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More important to the relationship between space, trafficking, and capacity in the Kyrgyz
Republic is the fact that the Republic exhibits nested spaces of contest and transition. As noted in
Chapter III, the foreign aid flows associated with both spaces have proved a significant
contributor to regressive capacity within the Republic.400 The fact that the republic is a space of
transit for illicit goods merely compounds this problem, as trafficking provides another means by
which corrupt elites can extract revenue to benefit themselves and their patronal networks. 401
Kinship and patronage networks play a key role in this extraction as they often serve as a money
laundering network not directly tied to the elite. 402 Given the existing criminal penetration of the
state, this behavior further serves to diminish state capacity by reducing fidelity in the state on
behalf of citizens to the detriment of ideational, implementational, and performative aspects of
state capacity.403 The issue of the windfall effects of regressive capacity is compounded when
state agents and resources allocated to combat the narcotics trade are themselves implicated in
trafficking – as alleged by interviewees and literature. 404
Granted, international funding plays a key role in subsidizing the regressive capacity of
the Kyrgyz state. This is especially true with regards to counter-narcotics and other securitization
efforts - such as counterterrorism. Elites in the Kyrgyz government take advantage of threats
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perceived by outside donors, such as terrorism and political instability, while doing little to
address some of the underlying causes of this behavior, such as prosecuting elite corruption,
working to counteract patronal politics, or addressing the grievances of citizens. The effects in
terms of regressive capacity are as much a result of Kyrgyz elites as they are the donors who
continue to subsidize their behavior.
Corruption in counter-narcotics efforts is not isolated, however. Instead, it is part of a
larger pattern of general corruption within the development sector contributes significantly to the
regressive capacity observed in the Republic. To reiterate the takeaway from one interview in
particular – aid fraud is a widespread but little acknowledged problem. 405 Aside from
manifesting in terms of regressive capacity, such corruption in the aid sector in-effect diminishes
the fiscal capacity of the Kyrgyz state. If foreign aid is indeed a critical aspect of fiscal capacity
in the Republic, losing hundreds of millions if not billions of dollars each year to graft is
doubtless a detriment to this fiscal capacity. 406 It likewise diminishes implementational capacity
via patronage; mid-level civil service positions and political appointeeships are often viewed as
money-making ventures. This contributes to bureaucratic corruption at the expense of merit and
expertise.407
Beyond issues of state capacity, this research supports the conclusions of some other
work conducted on narcotics trafficking in the Kyrgyz Republic. Most importantly, it supports
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the view that the nature of trafficking in Central Asia broadly and the Kyrgyz Republic
specifically is nuanced and multifaceted. 408 It likewise challenges discourse which posit the
states of the region are “narco-states,” despite significant state criminality and deeply-rooted
corruption.409 Likewise, there is little evidence supporting a broad insurgent-criminal nexus or
spectrum in Kyrgyzstan. Foreign-based militants such as largely defunct IMU play a
significantly smaller role in trafficking than may have been true historically. Instead, trafficking
is predominately affiliated with local mafias and criminal gangs as well as the state itself, as it is
in neighboring Tajikistan.410 While there are doubtless ties between militant groups and illicit
activities, with regards to the threat crime poses to state capacity, the most pressing concern
remains state involvement in criminality.
Finally, in terms of the role of identity, religion, kinship, and patronage in trafficking and
responses, there are several key takeaways. Foremost, many ethnically affiliated organized crime
syndicates remain active participants in narcotics trafficking alongside corrupt state officials. In
terms of responses, while some interviewees disputed the notion of state targeting of certain
ethnic groups with regard to narcotics policing, others refuted this notion. This competing
narrative is tempered by longstanding histories of ethnic strife in the Republic with acute spatial
dimensions. Law enforcement and judicial institutions dominated by ethnic Kyrgyz have
historically targeted ethnic Uzbeks, especially in the south. The current degree of discriminatory
policing with regards to narcotics trafficking remains unclear from interviews and literature
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review. By contrast, there appear to be few religious dimensions to trafficking beyond religion as
a specific marker of identity among crime syndicates. As noted, trafficking associated with
militant Islamists remains difficult to unearth. Arguably, kinship and patronage networks play
the single most significant role in trafficking and responses, as well as broader issues of crime
and corruption in general. Interviews consistently reiterated broader issues with corruption, and
in Kyrgyzstan as with many other countries, corruption has a certain element of wasta.
Conclusion: Chapter V
This section details the key findings of research conducted over the past two years,
including the findings of field interviews as well as assessments of publicly available data
regarded to narcotics trafficking. Importantly, this research challenges several longstanding
tropes regarding the Central Asian narcotics trade. Likewise, it supports the conclusions of other
research conducted in the social sciences on narcotics trafficking, crime, and capacity in
Kyrgyzstan. It concludes that while narcotics trafficking is a key challenge to state capacity in
Kyrgyzstan, there are other more significant challenges including broader state criminality,
challenging physical geography, patronage politics, and political and institutional
experimentation. With regards to how these processes manifest spatially, state capacity in the
Republic displays distinct aspects of center-periphery relations common in many countries which
face challenges of state capacity.
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Chapter VI: Conclusion
This research has sought to explore the effects of narcotics trafficking on the political
geography of the Kyrgyz Republic, with a specific interest in the role of kinship, ethnicity,
patronage, and religious affiliation as they pertain to narcotics trafficking and subsequent
responses. This section will provide a brief review of the findings of this research, followed by
the suggestion of several future areas of inquiry as well as key considerations for conducting
future research.
Summary of Research Findings
In short, this research draws several key conclusions with regard to narcotics trafficking,
state and societal responses, space, and state capacity in the Kyrgyz Republic. With regards to
trafficking, many discourses have historically been rooted in trafficking as a larger threat to
regional stability and the stability of individual republics in the region due to ties between
traffickers and militant groups. While some of these discourses indicate the issues associated
with trafficking and state-stability in terms of corruption, only relatively recently has work
emerged which presents a more nuanced view of trafficking in the region that disputes the
predominant narrative of an insurgent-criminal nexus. This thesis supports such scholarship; it
presents the view that trafficking in Central Asia broadly and Kyrgyzstan specifically is a
nuanced, multifaceted spatial process with a number of inputs and actors ranging from organized
crime syndicates to corrupt law enforcement and state elites. In this regard, while trafficking has
historically been viewed as a state-stability concern in terms of a source of revenue for militants,
there are other more significant threats to state capacity in the Kyrgyz Republic. Namely, broader
issues with patronal state-criminality present a more significant threat to capacity than trafficking
alone.
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Like trafficking itself, state and societal responses to narcotics trafficking prove equally
diverse in their aims and effectiveness. Some means of response actively contribute to corruption
and broader issues of regressive capacity within the Republic. Discussions of such responses
likewise indicated a significant albeit underacknowledged level of graft within the aid and
development sector within Kyrgyzstan. On a positive note, many of those interviewed indicated
that broader societal responses to trafficking in the republic are positive and preferable to
responses in surrounding countries.
In considering the role of ethnicity, religion, kinship, and patronage in these responses,
kinship and patronage predominate the discussion. Kinship and patronage are key dimensions
along which trafficking, corruption, and state crime are prosecuted. Religion was not viewed as a
significant aspect of trafficking – reinforcing the notion that trafficking by militant Islamists
remains scant. By contrast, religious revival following the end of the Soviet Union was construed
in interviews as a net-benefit to addressing issues of drug use and addiction, particularly among
youths in the South. The role of ethnicity in these processes remains more difficult to discern.
While some crime syndicates tend to be organized along ethnic lines, it is unclear based on
interviews alone whether responses to trafficking exhibit discrimination based on ethnicity.
Literature review would support this assessment of discriminatory enforcement by the state
based on longstanding historical precedents. Interviews, however, disputed this notion.
Regardless, ethnic issues remain a sensitive issue within the Kyrgyz Republic.
Finally, this thesis demonstrates that there are distinct spatial aspects to how the
processes of trafficking, and responses manifest. In one sense, they are tied to issues of state
capacity within the republic – with capacity itself a byproduct of political-geographic space.
Challenges to state capacity in-turn mean challenges to counter-narcotics efforts. Likewise,
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counter-narcotics efforts present a challenge to state capacity through official corruption, the
reinforcement of center-periphery relations, and the tolerance of powerful non-state actors who
may pose a threat to the state on a local or regional scale. These issues with capacity are innately
tied to development of political-geographic space in the republic.
Key Considerations and Future Research
Beyond providing a brief conclusion of research findings, it is necessary to note key
considerations and areas for future research. Concerning these considerations, this thesis operates
under the assumption that it presents an extremely limited view of an extremely complex
criminal environment and political-geographic landscape. This is a byproduct of research design,
fieldwork, and the two-year scope of this project. Future work would be well-served to
incorporate broader and more extensive fieldwork including more in-country travel and
interviews as well as focus-groups. Future work may also seek to broaden focus to the
transportation networks along which illicit goods are trafficked – as was suggested during field
interviews as well as the defense of this thesis.411 In the case of Kyrgyzstan, networks which may
serve as the basis for future analysis consist primarily of surface roads (See Appendix C).
Finally, the safety considerations for future work should not be understated. While this
researcher encountered no significant safety issues during field research, the topics investigated
remain sensitive within the Kyrgyz Republic. Any future work in Central Asia anticipates more
robust safety considerations.
Considering future directions of research, this thesis asserts that there are several areas
within geography which warrant further inquiry. This includes building upon Geography of
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Drugs literature outside the context of Latin America, where there is already significant
scholarship. While this thesis does not claim to fall within the purview of critical geography,
future work could benefit from incorporating critical-geographic approaches. This is particularly
with regards to examining discourses of the Eurasian drug trade as they pertain to the geopolitics
of security and securitization. Future critical work would likewise benefit in applying critical
discourses of the “War on Drugs,” to the Eurasian drug trade.
Beyond drug geographies, political geography would be well-served to devote efforts to
scholarship on state capacity. While this research benefited from examining state capacity from
the perspective of other social science disciplines, the dearth of work in political geography on
state capacity is surprising. In this sense, political geography and its focuses can bring valuable
perspective to broader social science discourses on capacity by emphasizing the role of space and
territory as aspects of capacity, among other considerations.
Broader inquiry in geography could also benefit by expanding the geographic scope of
this research to other countries in Southwest and Central Asia and North Africa. Unfortunately,
depending on the location the challenges of safety and access increase significantly. Likewise, as
noted in Chapter V, trafficking in synthetic narcotics represents a comparatively understudied
field of inquiry. Geography would be well served to capitalize on the current lack of scholarship
on trafficking in synthetic narcotics, especially in Southwest and Central Asia and North Africa.
Finally, this thesis should make clear that corruption and state crime prove more pressing
to issues of state capacity in Central Asia than narcotics trafficking – despite the close linkages
between the two. Much like state capacity, political geographies of corruption and state-crime
appear to be lacking. This thesis suggests that political geography would be well served at
devoting scholarship to examining political geographies of corruption and state-crime in Central
138

Asia and elsewhere. While these topics present challenges of safety and access, future research in
these subject areas is both warranted and justified given the current lacunae. Such work would be
well represented within political geography as well as regional studies of Southwest and Central
Asia. As is demonstrated, such work would likewise provide a valuable resource for informing
current and future policy debates on Central Asia – particularly those which pertain to counternarcotics, aid, and development.
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Appendix
Appendix A: Table of Acronyms
APC
AUCA
BRI
CSO
CPK
DDK
IGO
IMU
IRP
MoIA
NGO
NPS
stat.kg
SWANA
UN
UNODC
USSR

Armored Personnel Carrier
American University of Central Asia
Belt and Road Initiative
Civil Society Organization
Communist Party of Kyrgyzstan
Democratic Movement of Kyrgyzstan
International Governmental Organization
Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan
Islamic Renaissance Party (Tajikistan)
Ministry of Internal Affairs (Kyrgyz Republic)
Non-Governmental Organization
New Psychotropic Substances; Synthetic Narcotics
National Statistics Committee for the Kyrgyz Republic
Southwest Asia and North Africa
United Nations
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics; The Soviet Union
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Appendix B: Map of the Central Asia - 2002 412

412

“Russia and the Former Soviet Republics Maps - Perry-Castañeda Map Collection - UT Library Online,”
accessed April 18, 2019, https://legacy.lib.utexas.edu/maps/commonwealth.html#K.
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Appendix C: Map of the Kyrgyz Republic - 2005413

413

“Kyrgyzstan Maps - Perry-Castañeda Map Collection - UT Library Online,” accessed April 18, 2019,
https://legacy.lib.utexas.edu/maps/kyrgyzstan.html.

164

Appendix D: Ethnic Diversity in the Kyrgyz Republic (2017) 414
Ethnicity
Kyrgyz
Uzbek
Russian
Other*

Percentage of Population
73.2%
14.6%
5.8%
6.4%

*“Other” includes Dungan, German, Kazakh, Korean,
Tajik, Tatar, Turk, Ukrainian, and Uyghur*

414

“World Factbook - Kyrgyzstan.”
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Appendix E: Distribution of Ethnic Groups in the Kyrgyz Republic (2009) 415

415

Bond and Koch, “Interethnic Tensions in Kyrgyzstan.”
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Appendix F: 2010 Violence in Osh

Osh’s Prominent Lenin statue – located outside city offices –
during the violence of 2010 June (top)416 and during 2018 July (bottom; Photo by Author)

416

VOA News, Fourth Day of Ethnic Violence in Kyrgyzstan.
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Appendix G: Police Corruption

Kyrgyzstan’s traffic police are notoriously corrupt – often stopping motorists at random to extort
bribes for speeding – actual or perceived – and other minor violations or infractions. 417 In this
case, the “extra trouble,” was included in the final taxi fare. (Photo by Author)

417

Shishkin, Restless Valley.
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Appendix H: Sheep and Ladas

Sheep secured to the roof rack of a Lada sedan at a Saturday livestock market in Karakol
(Photo by Author)
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Appendix I: Views of Kyrgyz Citizens on the Collapse of the USSR418
"It is a tragedy that

Totally

Rather

Rather

Totally

Refused to Don’t

the Soviet Union

agree

agree

disagree

disagree

answer

know

ceased to exist.”
Kyrgyzstan (n=1000)

34.50%

17.45%

18.25%

23.47%

0.20%

6.12%

Bishkek (n=178)

46.63%

15.17%

14.61%

8.99%

0.56%

14.04%

Chui Oblast (n=138)

34.06%

13.77%

31.16%

15.22%

Issyk-Kul Oblast

41.38%

27.59%

13.79%

3.45%

Naryn Oblast (n=47)

10.64%

8.51%

31.91%

48.94%

Talas Oblast (n=46)

23.91%

30.43%

10.87%

34.78%

Osh Oblast (n=191)

29.32%

14.14%

12.57%

38.74%

Jalal-Abad Oblast

43.96%

15.93%

18.13%

21.98%

Batken Oblast (n=78)

19.23%

11.54%

17.95%

48.72%

2.56%

Osh (n=51)

22.00%

42.00%

20.00%

6.00%

10.00%

Male (n=493)

30.22%

15.01%

21.50%

27.59%

5.68%

Female (n=507)

38.66%

20.12%

14.99%

19.33%

0.39%

6.51%

25-35 y.o. (n=409

26.03%

16.55%

20.19%

29.20%

0.49%

7.54%

36-45 y.o. (n=293)

34.93%

19.52%

17.81%

19.52%

46-60 y.o. (n=298)

45.48%

17.06%

15.72%

19.40%

5.80%
1.15%

12.64%

(n=87)

5.24%

(n=183)

418

“The Central Asia Barometer.”
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8.22%
0.33%

2.01%

Appendix J: Manas

Manas and the Kyrgyz national flag on Bishkek’s main square (Photo by Author)
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Appendix K: IRB Approval
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Appendix L: Drug Graffiti

Examples of drug graffiti in Bishkek (top row, bottom row, center right) and Osh (center left;
near tourist hostel) advertising synthetic narcotics for sale via encrypted messaging services.
Tags affiliated with “@HORDE_KG” appeared outside the apartment of the author
shortly before the conclusion of fieldwork. (Photos by Author)
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Appendix M: Total Drug Seizures in 2011 & 2014 419

Data was provided by stat.kg; Bishkek and Osh Administrative Areas were excluded from this
representation (Maps by Author)
419

National Statistical Committee of the Kyrgyz Republic, “Stat.Kg.”
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